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ABSTRACT 
 
THE TURKEY-U.S.-ISRAEL TRIANGLE: 1991-2001 
 
CIRIK, H. KAYIHAN 
 
 
M.A. in International Relations 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Nur Bilge Criss 
July 2003, 154 pages 
 
During the Cold War, Turkey’s main focus was on the perceived Soviet 
threat from the north. Turkey became one of the countries most deeply affected 
by the end of the Cold War. In the 1990s, Turkey pursued an activist foreign 
policy course, which was encouraged by a variety of factors. Especially the 
Middle East has become the region that Turkey's active and assertive foreign 
policy practices are most profoundly seen. Turkey’s full backing for U.S. efforts 
in the Gulf War and building of close ties with Israel in this new era were 
outcomes of this assertive foreign policy course. 
The United States mostly realized the great importance of Turkey and its 
diverse strategic roles in the post-Cold War period. Although the two countries 
had different approaches and conflicting interests on some issues, where the 
Middle East became the region on which the most conflicting views came out, 
Turkey and the U.S. were mostly harmonious on various subjects. Developing 
close relations with Israel was among the major foreign policy orientations of 
Turkey. Both countries have benefited from this rapprochement and even they 
had some different approaches to some matters, positive outcomes of this 
strategic partnership have been more prominent. The triangular relationship 
between Turkey, the United States, and Israel had positive effects on the region 
and has been a very important force for maintaining peace and stability in the 
Middle East for a while. But one must keep in mind that it is not enough to 
assume that close ties in the past will assure smooth relations in the future. 
Strategic relations mean sharing plans, but this did not turn out to be the case 
for the triangular relationship in the long-run.  
 
Keywords: Turkey, the U.S., Israel, triangle, strategic partnership, 
foreign policy.  
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ÖZET 
 
TÜRKİYE-A.B.D.-İSRAİL ÜÇGENİ: 1991-2001 
 
CIRIK, H. KAYIHAN 
 
 
Uluslararası İlişkiler Yüksek Lisans 
Tez Danışmanı: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Nur Bilge Criss 
Temmuz 2003, 154 sayfa 
 
Soğuk Savaş süresince Türkiye, kuzeyden algıladığı Sovyet tehdidine 
odaklanmıştı. Türkiye, Soğuk Savaşın sona ermesinden en ciddi etkilenen 
ülkelerden biri oldu. Doksanlı yıllarda, Türkiye, çeşitli etmenler tarafından 
desteklenen aktif bir dış politika çizgisi takip etti. Orta Doğu, Türkiye’nin bu aktif 
ve iddialı dış politika uygulamalarının en çok görüldüğü bölge oldu. Türkiye’nin 
Körfez Savaşında Amerikan çabalarına tam destek vermesi ve bu yeni dönemde 
İsrail ile yakın ilişkiler kurması, bu iddialı dış politika uygulamalarının sonuçları 
idi.  
Amerika, Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde Türkiye’nin sahip olduğu büyük 
önemin ve çeşitli stratejik rollerin farkında vardı. İki ülke bazı konularda farklı 
yaklaşımlara ve çatışan çıkarlara sahip olmalarına rağmen, ki Orta Doğu üzerinde 
en fazla uyuşmazlığın ortaya çıktığı bölge olmuştur, Türkiye ve Amerika çok 
sayıda konu hakkında genellikle uyum içerisinde olmuştur. İsrail ile yakın ilişkiler 
geliştirmek, Türkiye’nin önde gelen dış politika uygulamalarından olmuştur. Her 
iki ülke bu yakınlaşmadan fayda elde etmiştir ve bazı konulara farklı yaklaşsalar 
da bu stratejik ortaklığın olumlu sonuçları daha belirgin olmuştur. Türkiye, 
Amerika ve İsrail arasındaki üçlü ilişkinin bölge üzerinde olumlu etkileri olmuştur 
ve bu ilişki Orta Doğu’da barış ve istikrarın sağlanmasında bir süre önemli bir güç 
olmuştur. Fakat unutulmamalıdır ki, geçmişteki yakın ilişkiler, gelecekte de 
ilişkilerin iyi olacağını farz etmek için yeterli değildir. Stratejik ilişkiler, ortak 
planlara sahip olmak anlamına gelir fakat üçlü ilişkilerde uzun dönemde durum 
böyle olmamıştır.    
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye, A.B.D., İsrail, üçgen, stratejik ortaklık, 
dış politika.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Throughout the Cold War, Turkey’s main focus was on the perceived 
Soviet threat from the north. Turkish foreign and security policy attitude was 
limited to a few basic but difficult and crucial issues, namely to contain Soviet 
power, to protect Turkish interests in relation to Greece and Cyprus, and to 
maintain and strengthen ties with the West in general and with the United 
States in particular. Moreover, somewhat less critical but still important were 
issues of furthering Turkey’s integration with Western Europe and, during the 
latter part of the Cold War, defending against terrorism supported by neighbors 
like Syria, Iraq, and Iran. The Turkish Republic pursued a policy of neutrality 
and non-alignment, through the Atatürk era, which seemed to fit Turkey’s 
objectives in the conjuncture. Turkey focused its energy on internal 
development and sought to avoid foreign tensions that could divert it from that 
goal. It remained neutral almost all of Word War II, but joined the allied side 
only in the last days with the conclusion already decided. Stalin’s post-World 
War II claims on Turkish territory pushed Turkey to an alliance with the West. 
Later, in the mid-1960s, Turkish foreign policy experienced another change and 
Turkish policymakers started to reorient their foreign policy away from excessive 
dependence on the United States.1 
The end of the Cold War and the superpower competition together has 
had important effects on global and regional politics. Turkey was among the 
countries most deeply affected by the end of the Cold War and rapidly changing 
international environment, particularly the transformation of the political and 
                                                 
1 Alan Makovsky, “The New Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy”, SAIS Review, (Winter-
Spring1999), pp.92-113, and Insight Turkey, 1:2 (April-June1999), pp.3-21.    
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strategic landscape of Eastern Europe and Central Asia, the outbreak of brutal 
ethno-national conflicts in the Balkans and the Caucasus, and the changing 
environment in the Middle East. These developments drastically changed 
Turkey's foreign policy environment, creating opportunities to expand its role 
while also presenting new risks and challenges.2 
In the 1990s, Turkey pursued an activist foreign policy course, which was 
encouraged by a variety of factors. The upsurge of political instability, war and 
ethnic conflict in the vicinity of Turkey, in the Middle East, the Caucasus and the 
Balkans stimulated Ankara to become involved in these regions. Especially the 
Middle East has become the region that Turkey's active and assertive foreign 
policy practices are most profoundly seen. Turkey’s full backing for U.S. efforts 
in the Gulf War and building of close ties with Israel in the 1990s were outcomes 
of this assertive foreign policy course. As Criss and Bilgin stated, Turkish foreign 
policy towards the Middle East has always been regarded as an extension of its 
pro-Western foreign policy. Besides its Middle Eastern aspects, the new Turkish-
Israeli rapprochement has also strengthened this general feature, particularly 
regarding Turkey’s relations with the United States.3  
In line with these considerations, by this thesis, it will be attempted to 
find and provide answers to the following questions: 
1. How and why did Turkey’s foreign policy alter in the post-Cold War era 
regarding its surrounding regions in general and the Middle East in 
particular? 
                                                 
2 Sabri Sayari, “Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: the Challenges of Multi-
Regionalism”, Journal of International Affairs, 54:1, (Fall 2000), p.169. 
3 Nur Bilge Criss, Pınar Bilgin, “Turkish Foreign Policy Toward the Middle East.”, Middle East 
Review of International Affairs, 1:1, (January 1997). 
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2. How and why Turkey’s foreign policy alterations affect Turkish-American 
relations in the new era? 
3. What are the motives and interests behind the Turkish-Israeli 
rapprochement? 
4. What were the implications of the Turkish-American-Israeli strategic 
partnership in the Middle East? 
 This study begins, in Chapter I, with the evaluation of the Turkish foreign 
policy alterations in its surrounding regions in general, and in the Middle East in 
particular. After a brief summary of Turkish Foreign policy during the Cold War, 
the reasons of new policies of the country in the post-Cold War period will be 
explained. While pursuing prudent policies in some regions like the Caucasus 
and Central Asia, and supporting multilateralism in others like in the Balkans, 
Turkey has pursued an assertive activism in the Middle East. Turkey’s new 
foreign policy course also had effects on its relations with the United States. 
 Chapter II will explain the Turkish-U.S. relations after the disappearance 
of the common challenge. Following a short review of the history of Turkish-U.S. 
relations, effects of the end of the Cold War on the relations will be made clear. 
Redefinition of Turkey’s geo-strategic significance and areas of divergence and 
convergence between the two countries will be examined. While the Middle East 
became the region on which the most conflicting views came out, developing 
close relations between Turkey and Israel was among the major foreign policy 
orientations of Turkey.   
 The Turkish-Israeli rapprochement will be evaluated in Chapter III. 
Important changes and developments in the 1990s as well as appropriate 
 4 
conditions that emerged after the Gulf War, which gave Turkey the opportunity 
to shape its Middle East policy freely and attempts to get closer to Israel, will be 
discussed. Improving relations between the two countries on both civilian and 
military domains plus motives and common interests will be studied. The 
Turkish-Israeli relations have important linkage to the United States which also 
needed to be examined. 
Then, Chapter IV will examine the triangular relationship between 
Turkey, the United States and Israel. U.S. interests in Turkish-Israeli relations, 
approaches of the three countries to the challenges of Iran, Iraq, and Syria and 
triple exercises conducted by Turkey, the U.S., and Israel will be scrutinized. 
And implications of the triangle will be clarified, given the available data. 
 This study was formed in four interrelated chapters, where reasons of 
Turkey’s new foreign policy course and in turn its affects on Turkey’s relations 
with the United States and Israel as well as the trilateral relations between these 
three countries were examined.      
The methodology used in this thesis relies primarily on a descriptive 
analysis of resources. The resources used are primary sources, including treaties 
and transcripts of government policy statements, and secondary resources such 
as scholarly and journal articles.  
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CHAPTER 1 
TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 
AND ACTIVIST POLICY TOWARDS THE MIDDLE EAST  
1.1. Turkish Foreign Policy during the Cold War 
During the Cold War era, Turkey’s security was mostly shaped by its 
location as a neighbor of the Soviet Union. Its foreign and security policy 
attitude was relatively restricted and obviously dominated by the country's role 
in the containment of Soviet power. There were also some essential but difficult 
and vital subjects; namely, the protection of Turkish interests in relation to 
Greece and Cyprus, and maintaining and strengthening ties with the West, 
particularly the United States and NATO. Additionally, somewhat less critical but 
still important were issues of furthering Turkey’s integration with Western 
Europe and, during the latter part of the Cold War, defending against terrorism 
supported by neighbors like Syria, Iraq, and Iran.4 
To start with, a brief outlook of the evolution of Turkey’s foreign policy 
strategy will be beneficial. The international status and borders of the Turkish 
Republic were established by the Lausanne Peace Treaty of 24 July 1923 which 
also provided the basis for the creation of the climate of peace and stability 
needed by the country. Since then, Turkish foreign policy guided by well-known 
principle “peace at home, peace in the world” attributed to the founder of the 
modern Turkish state, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. This was reasonable for a country 
in the middle of fundamental reforms and development with its geographical 
location. The Turkish Republic put an end to expansionist foreign policy of its 
                                                 
4 Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayari, (eds.), Turkey’s New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish 
Foreign Policy (Washigton D.C: The Washigton Institute for Near East Policy, 2000), Introduction.   
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predecessor, the Ottoman Empire, abstained from getting involved in the 
turbulent affairs of neighboring regions and concentrated mostly on domestic 
issues. In this perspective, the primary objectives of Turkish foreign policy were 
to establish and to develop friendly relations with all countries, particularly with 
neighboring ones; to promote and to join regional and international cooperation; 
to resolve disputes through peaceful means and to contribute to regional 
security, peace and stability.5 
During the Atatürk era, Turkey’s international course was neutrality and 
non-alignment which appeared to fit its objectives in the conjuncture. The 
Turkish Republic was mainly focused on internal structuring to strengthen its 
statehood, to create a strong, modern state which could preserve its territorial 
integrity and political independence, and further to make Turkey a full, equal 
member of the Western community of nations. Atatürk concluded a series of 
treaties with neighboring states aiming to form a security belt on its western and 
eastern borders. Turkey played a leading role in the establishment of the Balkan 
Entente of 1934 and the Saadabad Pact of 1937. The Montreux Convention for 
the Turkish Straits was also signed in 1936.6 
Turkey remained neutral during almost all of the Second Word War, 
joined the allied side only in the concluding months of the war with the result 
already decided. In the aftermath of Word War II and the development of a 
                                                 
5 See Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu, “Turkey’s Security and the Middle East”, Foreign Affairs, 62:1, (Fall 
1983). 
6 Balkan Entente, formed by Turkey, Greece, Romania and Yugoslavia on 9 February 1934, to 
protect the borderline in the Balkan states, aimed at developing cooperation among these states 
and aimed at Bulgaria which was following a revisionist policy in the region; Saadabat Pact, 
formed by Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan, in 1937 with the principle of non-interference in 
each others’ affairs; Montreux Convention, on 20 July 1936, re-established Turkish sovereignty 
over the Straits, with full right to remilitarize the zone, Ankara thus gained a heightened sense of 
international security in a period of growing distrust of collective security and non-aggression 
pacts.  
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bipolar international system, foreign policy decision-making in Turkey became 
widely defined by the role Ankara played in the international system. In 1945, 
Moscow abrogated the Turkish-Soviet Treaty of Neutrality and Nonaggression of 
1925 and demanded the return of Kars and Ardahan provinces, as well as 
military bases along the İstanbul (Bosphorus) and Çanakkale (Dadanelles) 
Straits. Unsurprisingly, this crisis led Turkish politicians to realize the seriousness 
of the threat coming from the Soviets, and pushed Ankara toward alliance with 
the West.7 
In this new bipolar international system, neutrality could no longer 
guarantee the security and integrity of the Turkish state. Therefore the 
policymakers recognized that they would only be able to prevent Moscow’s 
demands if Turkey had Western support for its defense, and Ankara shifted from 
its previous policy of neutrality. With the Truman Doctrine of 1947, Washington 
supplied considerable amount of military and financial assistance to support 
Turkey’s efforts in opposing Soviet claims. Later in 1950, in order to prove its 
commitment to the West, Turkey actively got involved in the Korean War and 
contributed troops to the Allied coalition mission. As a result Turkey joined 
NATO in 1952. The Balkan Pact of 1954 and the Baghdad Pact of 1955 were 
also developments related to Turkey’s alignment to the West. For the next four 
decades, Turkish security policies were basically conducted parallel with NATO’s 
strategies, namely containing the Soviet threat.8  
                                                 
7 Yasemin Çelik, Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy (Westport, Connecticut: Preager, 1999), 
pp.xi-xiv.   
8 Balkan Pact, treaty of alliance, political cooperation, and mutual assistance between Turkey, 
Greece, and Yugoslavia, was signed on August 9, 1954, in an atmosphere in which Yugoslavia 
had tense relations with Soviets; the Baghdad Pact, also referred to as ‘Middle East Treaty 
Organization’, was signed on February 24, 1955 between Turkey and Iraq, later UK, Pakistan, 
and Iran, finally with Iranian signature in November 1955, joined. This involved cooperation for 
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Two exceptions to this situation were the eruption of the Cyprus crises of 
1963-1964 and 1973-1974. With the purpose of protecting and ensuring the 
security of the Turkish Cypriot community during the bi-communal violence in 
Cyprus, Turkey decided to intervene in the island but US president Lyndon 
Johnson sent his famous letter of 1964, warning Turkey to stop preparations for 
an intervention and threatening Turkey that it could not trust US protection if 
Soviets were involved in the conflict. The thought that Turkey could find itself 
isolated on security issues, forced policymakers to begin to reorient their foreign 
policy away from excessive dependence on the United States, and starting a 
rapprochement with Moscow. In 1974, after a coup staged against Makarios 
with the objective of forming union with Greece, Turkish troops intervened and 
undertook military operations, opposing the advice of the US. Then the US 
Congress imposed an arms embargo on Turkey that would last until 1978.9 
The mid-1960s was the time when the international environment was 
changing as a result of détente, and the hostilities between the superpowers 
were rather subsided. Turkish policy makers, in this period, were able to give 
more emphasis to developing relations with Eastern European countries and the 
Soviet Union. Turkey felt itself more capable of producing foreign policy 
behaviors independent from American interests whose effects could be seen in 
1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars. In 1963, Turkey became the Associate 
                                                                                                                                          
security and defense and refraining from any form of interference in one another’s internal 
affairs, took the name Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) after Iraq left in 1959.  
9 Malik Mufti, “Daring and Caution in Turkish Foreign Policy," Middle East Journal, 52:1, (Winter 
1998), pp.41-42. 
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Member of the European Economic Community, the forerunner of the European 
Union, and established strong economic ties with member states.10 
Despite these brief alterations in foreign policy manner, developments by 
the end of the 1970s, namely Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian 
Revolution, the so called second Cold War, led Turkish policy makers to reassess 
ties with the West. For most of the Cold War period, for that reason, Turkey 
remained loyally Western oriented in its foreign policy course.11 
Another important element of Turkish foreign policy during the Cold War 
period was the effort to stay out of the unstable affairs and politics of the Middle 
East. Saadabad Pact of 1937, with the principle of not interfering in each others’ 
affairs, was a successful example of how Turkey’s foreign policy kept itself away 
from the Middle East.12 There was a brief period in which Turkish policymakers 
wandered away from their established pattern. Turkey joined the Baghdad Pact 
and the succeeding Central Treaty Organization with the desire of having a 
leadership position. But the effectiveness of the pact had undoubtedly been 
questionable. All through the 1950s, Turkish foreign policy was obviously a 
product of pro-Western alignment, and its foreign policy purposes reflected 
Turkey’s fears that the Soviet Union was enlarging its influence over Middle 
Eastern countries. Throughout the rest of the Cold War era, Turkey stayed out 
of the conflicts of the region.13 
                                                 
10 Yasemin Çelik, Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy (Westport, Connecticut: Preager, 1999), 
pp.48-50.   
11 Nur Bilge Criss, Pınar Bilgin, “Turkish Foreign Policy Toward the Middle East.”, Middle East 
Review of International Affairs, 1:1, (January 1997). 
12 Nur Bilge Criss, Pınar Bilgin, “Turkish Foreign Policy Toward the Middle East.”, Middle East 
Review of International Affairs, 1:1, (January 1997). 
13 Mustafa Aydın, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures 
during the Cold War”, Middle Eastern Studies, 36:1, (January2000), pp. 113-114. 
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Turkey’s foreign policy challenges during the Cold War were risky and 
posed real dangers, besides the threat of nuclear destruction shared by all NATO 
allies. Conversely, the Cold War also imposed a certain amount of order, 
regularity, and predictability. As a NATO member, Turkey’s long border with the 
Soviets and its short one with another Warsaw Pact ally, Bulgaria, remained 
calm. With the likely exception of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, direct 
hostilities with the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact were unlikely during the 
Cold War. For the duration of the Cold War period, Turkey’s regional 
environment had presented more stability than it did in the Post Cold War era. 
The Balkans were controlled by Tito’s rule in Yugoslavia and by the power that 
the Soviet Union implemented over most parts of the region. The Caucasus and 
Central Asia were under strict control of Moscow. The Middle East was a source 
of instability but unlikely to provoke an actual war.14 
Why did Turkish foreign policy change its track from the policy of 
neutrality of roughly the first two decades after the foundation of the Republic? 
The first reason was that there was a change in the nature of the international 
system which developed from a ‘balance of power’ structure to a ‘bi-polar’ one, 
in which a policy of neutrality was not very rational or possible in any way for a 
country like Turkey. The other reason was that the Soviet Union came out as a 
superpower and had claims upon Turkey. Besides, the victory of the Western 
democracies and Turkey’s belief in this system, and economic needs of the 
country, a remarkable chance in the Turkish political structure, namely the 
                                                 
14 Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayari, (eds.), Turkey’s New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish 
Foreign Policy (Washigton D.C: The Washigton Institute for Near East Policy, 2000), Introduction. 
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transition to a multi-party system, and economic needs were other reasons for 
Turkey to choose the Western course.15 
A different question is why did Turkish foreign policy experience another 
change in the mid 1960s? The Cyprus question came out as the most substantial 
factor leading to the reassessment and diversification efforts of Turkish foreign 
policy. The 1964 Cyprus crisis and the Johnson letter were regarded as the 
turning point. The détente process and the following softening of inter-block 
tensions were the other reasons. Furthermore, Turkish leaders’ realization that 
their firm adherence to a pro-Western alignment in a period of changing 
international system had left Turkey nearly isolated in the world, led to the 
changes in Turkish foreign policy.16  
In the post-Cold War era, Turkey faced no existing threats, but even 
though there was no fear of nuclear war, its neighboring region was more 
complicated than the previous era. Undoubtedly, there were growing numbers 
of regional problems Turkey faced in the new era. Turkey was directly involved 
in some different, if overlapping, regions: Western Europe, the Balkans, the 
Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, the Caucasus-Caspian 
complex, Central Asia, and the Black Sea. This new post-Soviet world was still 
full of threats and also opportunities for Turkey.  In addition, the removal of the 
Soviet Union’s influence from the Arab world has given more flexibility to 
Turkey’s Middle Eastern policies.17  
 
                                                 
15 Mustafa Aydın, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures 
during the Cold War”, Middle Eastern Studies, 36:1, (January2000), pp.106-110. 
16 Ibid., pp.115-130. 
17 Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayari, (eds.), Turkey’s New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish 
Foreign Policy (Washigton D.C: The Washigton Institute for Near East Policy, 2000), Introduction. 
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1.2. Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era:  
 1.2.1. General 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the world witnessed remarkable 
changes. These were; the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, 
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, collapse of totalitarian regimes, emergence of 
new independent states, Gulf War, reunification of Germany, spread of pluralist 
democracy and free market economies, especially in Europe, and the end of the 
bipolar system and East-West rivalry. Additionally, new threats to security 
emerged, such as ethnic nationalism, irredentism, religious fundamentalism and 
international terrorism, causing regional instability and conflicts.18 
 The end of the Cold War and the superpower competition together has 
had important effects on global and regional politics. In this new era, all states 
sought to adjust to the new international realities. Turkey was among the 
countries most deeply affected by the end of the Cold War and rapidly changing 
international environment, particularly the transformation of the political and 
strategic landscape of Eastern Europe and Central Asia and the outbreak of 
brutal ethno-national conflicts in the Balkans and the Caucasus. These 
developments drastically changed Turkey's foreign policy environment, creating 
opportunities to expand its role while also presenting new risks and challenges.19 
With the increase in the number of Turkey’s neighbors, new independent 
republics, forgotten kindred, and brother republics had entered into the area of 
                                                 
18 See www.mfa.gov.tr, the official web site of Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Turkish 
Foreign Policy”. 
19 Sabri Sayari, “Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: the Challenges of Multi-
Regionalism”, Journal of International Affairs, 54:1, (Fall 2000), p.169. 
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interest of Turkish foreign policy.20 Furthermore, some internal developments, 
namely the intensification of the Kurdish problem and the strengthening of 
political Islam that increased tension on Turkey's political and social order, made 
the difficult task of adjustment to the post-Cold War international system even 
more challenging for Turkey than for most other countries.21 In other words, 
Turkey has not come out from the Cold War with a sense of increased security.22 
Many people had guessed that the end of the Cold War and the removal 
of the Soviet threat would diminish Turkey’s strategic importance for the West in 
general, and the United States in particular. But the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 
gave Turkey a chance to secure its strategic position in the new international 
environment, and to reassert its role and importance in the new era.23 To meet 
the challenges of this period, Turkey altered some of its established Republican 
foreign policy principles and assumed new initiatives. Ankara’s attempts had 
been described by Makovsky as a policy of "new activism", and by Müfti as the 
policy that presented both "daring and caution”.24 Without a doubt, Turkish 
foreign policy in the 1990s was considerably more activist and self-confident in 
the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia. On the other hand, 
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50. 
 14 
this did not mean to give up the traditional Turkish approach to international 
and regional affairs that can be described as moderate and cautious.25 
In order to understand the reasons for alterations in Turkish foreign 
policy, its security environment, in the new era should be glanced at briefly. At 
the centre of a huge landscape, Eurasia, stretching from Europe to Central Asia, 
Turkey is surrounded by neighbors with whom it has had problematic relations 
and concerns. These concerns were primarily related to four neighboring 
countries, namely, Greece, Syria, Russia and Iran. Turkey has territorial disputes 
with Greece. In addition to the well known Cyprus and Aegean problems 
between the two countries, new ones came out in the post cold war period. In 
June 1995, the Greek Parliament ratified the international Law of the Sea 
Treaty, paving the way for an extension of territorial waters to 12 miles, which 
Ankara threatened war if Greece implements the 12-mile limit. Moreover, 
Greece’s support to Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the crisis of the islet of 
Kardak, called İmia by Greece, in 1996, and further the crisis with the Greek 
Cypriot government regarding the air defense missile system (S-300) in 1996-
97, worsened relations between the two countries. Syria, as well, is another 
neighbor with which Turkey has territorial disputes. Damascus has longstanding 
claims on Hatay (sancak of Alexandratta) province, has been against the 
construction of dams on the Euphrates River, and provided safe heaven to 
PKK.26  
Two other neighbors can be labeled as Turkey’s rivals on the issue of 
having influence over the Caucasus and Central Asia. Turkey had concerns 
                                                 
25 Sabri Sayari, “Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: the Challenges of Multi-
Regionalism”, Journal of International Affairs, 54:1, (Fall 2000), 169. 
26 Malik Mufti, “Daring and Caution in Turkish Foreign Policy," Middle East Journal, 52:1, (Winter 
1998), pp.34-36. 
 15 
about Russia’s manipulation of regional conflicts to draw the former Soviet 
Republics back into its sphere of influence. The two countries were also in 
disagreement over the question of how the Caspian oil was to be exported. 
Chechen and Kurdish issues were subjects of tension between Turkey and 
Russia. Regarding Iran, on the other hand, there is a competition between 
Turkey’s secular republicanism and Iran’s Islamic revolution. Existence of 
Azerbaijani Turks, which compose one third of Iran’s population, is also a factor 
boosting up Tehran’s concerns.27                   
Furthermore, Ankara’s suspicion of the unreliability of its Western Allies, 
as an historical legacy of Turkish foreign policy, had played an important role in 
shaping Turkey’s new policy orientation. Some events that shaped and 
strengthen the suspicion of Turkey were, as mentioned above, the Jupiter 
missile crisis, even if for the wrong reasons, the Johnson letter, and the US arms 
embargo.28  
The reasons for Turkey’s more assertive policies were different and 
overlapping. Economic growth, due to the major reforms which were undertaken 
in 1980, and the growing prosperity have differentiated Turkey from many of its 
neighbors and created a sense of self-confidence. In addition, by increasing its 
defense expenditures, Ankara upgraded its military equipment to have a more 
efficient military and the increase in military capacity gave Turkey the ability for 
power projection into adjacent regions. In contrast, especially three of its 
traditional rivals, namely, Russia, Iraq and Syria have experienced severe 
weaknesses in military strength in the 1990s. Syria has not been receiving 
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advanced weaponry free of charge from Moscow, and has not been able to 
modernize its equipment. Similarly, Iraq's military was badly damaged in the 
Gulf War, and sanctions imposed on the country reduced its ability to get new 
equipment. Besides the weakening of these states, Turkey no longer shared a 
border with Russians for the first time in centuries. And Iran might be added to 
the list as a weakening neighbor who had troubled economy after an eight-year 
war with Iraq in the 1980s. Another reason was that the new era created new 
regional opportunities for Turkey with its ethnic, racial, religious and linguistic 
ties to the neighboring regions of the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Central Asia 
and the Middle East. And finally, by the end of the Cold War and the restraints it 
imposed, Turkey felt a greater sense of policy independence.29    
Another factor also affected the process of Turkey’s new policy 
orientation which is the changing dynamics of the Turkish foreign policy decision 
making. Traditionally, Turkish foreign policy was determined by the prime 
minister, foreign minister and the military. In the 1990s, the presidency had 
come out as a key player, beginning with President Turgut Özal (1989-93), 
actually as a consequence of the 1982 Constitution.30  
On some matters, mainly the ones relating to Middle East, specifically, 
northern Iraq, Syria and even Cyprus, in Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey 
implemented policies that were daring and risky. But, on others, regarding the 
ethnic and national conflicts in the Balkans and the Caucasus, Turkish activism 
                                                 
29 Alan Makovsky, “The New Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy”, SAIS Review, (Winter-
Spring1999), pp.94-100.  
30 Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayari, (eds.), Turkey’s New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish 
Foreign Policy (Washigton D.C: The Washigton Institute for Near East Policy, 2000). 
 17 
was visibly cautious and modest, despite significant public pressure for greater 
military aid to struggling Muslim and Turkic communities.31  
  
 1.2.2. Assertive Activism in the Middle East and the Eastern 
Mediterranean: 
The Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean have become regions 
where Turkey's active and assertive foreign policy practices are most strongly 
seen. As mentioned before, Turkey has continuously pursued cautious and 
modest policies toward its southern neighbors, with the exception of a brief 
period in the mid-1950s, because of a number of worries. With its center of 
attention on the Soviet threat from the north, Turkey had been concerned about 
the possibility of being drawn into regional conflicts, and some regional 
countries’ close ties with the former Soviet Union had restricted Ankara’s actions 
during the Cold War period.32 
But the Gulf Crisis marked the beginning of a new period in Turkish 
foreign policy toward the region. Turkey became one of the first countries to ally 
with the United States against the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in August 1990, 
and joined the United Nations coalition. Later, in the first week of the crisis, 
Turkey closed the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık oil pipeline in line with the UN embargo.33 
When the air war against Iraq commenced on January 18, 1991, the Turkish 
government allowed American military aircraft to use the Incirlik Air Base for air 
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strikes into Iraq and deployed Turkish troops alongside the Iraqi border to 
intimidate Saddam Hussein about the possibility of two-front war. The main 
reason for Ankara’s direct involvement in the Gulf War was President Özal’s 
desire to protect Turkey’s role and strategic importance in the post-Cold War era 
where its traditional geo-strategic position against Soviet expansionism would no 
longer be of great value to its Western allies. The decision to become so 
engaged in the crisis was made almost totally by President Turgut Özal. 
Nevertheless, many among the Turkish political and military elites were similarly 
concerned that involvement in the Allied coalition would cause Turkey to 
undergo unnecessary threat from Iraq with which Turkey shares a long border. 
Foreign minister Ali Bozer’s and Defense minister Sefa Giray’s resignations from 
their cabinet positions in October 1990 were followed by the resignation of Chief 
of Staff, Gen. Necip Torumtay, in December, because of his disagreement with 
Özal’s personalized way of policymaking.34  
Turkey’s participation in the Gulf War had some positive as well as some 
negative effects. The United States and the European Community expanded the 
value of Turkish textile quota, the US contributed additional military and 
economic assistance and also influenced Egypt to buy Turkish manufactured F-
16s, and furthermore Turkey’s role in the Gulf War highlighted the value of the 
Turkish alliance to the West and Turkey’s geopolitical importance. On the 
negative side, Turkey lost quite a lot of money in rental revenue that it had been 
earning before the war, from the pipeline that carried Iraqi oil to the 
Mediterranean. Moreover, Turkey and Iraq had been close trading partners prior 
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to the war but the United Nations sanctions imposed on Iraq affected this 
partnership negatively.35 
Another negative development for Turkey was the establishment of the 
autonomous Kurdish region in northern Iraq as an outcome of the Gulf War. As 
a result, the extension of Turkey’s role in the Middle East continued after the 
Gulf War. The emergence of a power vacuum in this area enabled PKK to set up 
bases and camps to launch operations into Turkey. Ankara acted in response to 
the PKK's challenge and practiced active policies in northern Iraq while 
toughening its military counter-insurgency operations.  Since then, Turkish 
military has mounted incursions into northern Iraq, trying to destroy PKK camps 
and pursue PKK militants. Later on, the basis of the Turkish foreign policy 
toward northern Iraq became to preserve the territorial integrity and the 
national unity of Iraq.36 
As the regional consequences of the Gulf War, pan-Arab solidarity had 
been totally set aside, and the region had no longer been perceived as a mono-
ethnic district merely composed of Arabs. The new vision of an enlarged Middle 
East, including Turkey, Israel, Iran and the Kurds, effected Turkey’s perceptions 
deeply.37 Syria, besides the aforementioned ongoing disputes, was playing the 
‘Kurdish card’ in relations with Turkey, through its support for PKK operations. 
Egypt has been suspicious about Turkey's role as a rival in Middle Eastern affairs 
outside the Arab framework, because of Turkey’s pro-Western stance. Jordan 
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has been open to a strengthened security relationship with Turkey, to some 
extent as an additional measure of assurance against its own insecure 
environment. Iran on the other hand has had regional weight and it was an 
energy producer and supplier for Turkey. But Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile 
programs are of considerable concern to Turkey, and Tehran’s support to 
Hezbollah and PKK has worsened the relations between the two countries.38    
In consequence of all the abovementioned developments, Turkey took 
some actions in accordance with its new foreign policy posture. One of these 
was Ankara’s threat to use military force in case the Greek Cypriots deployed the 
S-300 surface-to-air missiles system in the southern part of the island. Ankara 
has considered Cyprus an important base for the security of Turkey’s southern 
coasts and a key element in the defense of southern Anatolia. This includes the 
security of the oil traffic route from the Bay of İskenderun after a full resumption 
of Iraqi oil delivery through the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık oil pipeline or after the 
possible new flow to Turkey’s Mediterranean shore from the Caspian basin. So 
Turkey reacted strongly to Greek Cypriot plans to acquire Soviet made S-300 
missile system, and demonstrated its determination by military maneuvers in 
northern Cyprus that supposedly were training troops to destroy the missiles. 
After repeated Greek Cypriot rescheduling of the date of delivery from autumn 
1997 to late 1998, Greek Cypriots and Greeks agreed to deploy the missiles in 
Crete. Turkey's threat to act disclosed a new assertiveness and confidence in its 
                                                 
38 Ian O. Lesser, “Turkey in a Changing Security Environment”, Journal of International Affairs, 
54:1 (Fall2000), p.191. 
 21 
foreign policy, and may also be a sign of the changing military balance in the 
post-Cold War eastern Mediterranean.39 
Another striking example was Turkey’s decision to send a strong and 
decisive signal to Syria in 1998. Turkey showed its determination to follow its 
own policy on the Kurdish problem and threatened Syria to use military force if 
the PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan, were not expelled from his longtime refuge in 
Damascus. The Turkish military buildup along the border in early October 1998 
convinced Syria about Ankara’s seriousness. Having positioned most of its troops 
near the Israeli border, Syria would not have been able to resist a Turkish 
invasion. With the fear of engaging in a two-front war between Turkey and 
Israel, Damascus accepted the Turkish proposal. On October 19, 1998 the two 
countries signed an agreement in which Damascus pledged to stop its support 
for the PKK. The confrontation with Syria, which led to Öcalan's expulsion from 
that country, was an outstanding example of the transition from the foreign 
policy behavior of the Cold War period to a more active approach to issues that 
Turkish policymakers perceived to be critical to national security.40 
But the effective role which the Turkish-Israeli rapprochement played in 
the examples given above should be kept in mind. Additionally, Turkish 
authorities charged Iran with giving the PKK logistic support and heartening its 
attacks inside Turkey. These occurrences brought tensions between the two 
countries while Iran rejected these accusations. It has even been rumored that 
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irritated Turkish government thought of a military attack on PKK bases in Iran in 
May 1995.41  
At this point, it is necessary to mention the hostile alliances that 
appeared to encircle Turkey. In addition to Russia’s treaties with Georgia in 
August 1992 and Armenia in September 1995, allowing Russian military bases 
on their territories, and the arms sales to Greek Cypriots, as mentioned earlier, 
Moscow concluded an agreement on military and technical cooperation with 
Greece in November 1995. Moreover, Russia stayed as the diplomatic ally and 
the arms supplier of Syria while relations between Iran and Russia were getting 
better. Greece, on the other hand, signed agreements with Bulgaria in the early 
1990s for executing joint military exercises, concluded military agreements with 
Syria and Russia in 1995, and signed a military accord with Armenia in June 
1996. Turkey watched the steps being taken by Greece to encircle Turkey 
militarily with concern.42  
With the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, new countries 
and thus new neighbors appeared in the periphery of Turkey. The emergence of 
new regions of opportunity expanded the horizons of Turkish foreign policy and 
increased its alternatives. On the other hand, with the purpose of overcoming 
the troubles related to its neighbors, Turkey has found opportunities to 
strengthen its relations and create a security web with the countries on the 
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other side of its neighboring countries. Ankara’s developing relations with Israel 
and Ukraine could be dealt with in this context.43 
In the light of the developments mentioned above, and in the appropriate 
atmosphere created by the Oslo Agreement of September 1993, which was 
signed between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and by 
PLO’s recognition of Israel, Turkey boosted its relations with Israel. In the first 
half of the 1990s, high-level Turkish and Israeli visits took place, including 
presidents, prime ministers and foreign ministers. The signing of a military 
cooperation and training agreement in February was followed by a free trade 
agreement in March 1996. The conclusion of these agreements created an 
influential new alignment between the region's two strongest states; 
economically and militarily, which had important implications for regional 
balances of power. This strategic relationship was later reinforced by a number 
of developments in both military and civilian fields. Despite the fact that both 
countries repeatedly stressed that the military agreements were not directed 
against third parties, it was not welcomed by the Arab world, but this 
rapprochement presented Turkey several advantages. Turkey got a stronger 
deterrence capability against its problematic neighbors as it was proven in the 
crisis of Syria and Cyprus as mentioned earlier. The military agreement on 
defense industry has set up the legal framework for the transfer of military 
technology and know-how between the two countries. Israel also became an 
alternative source for Turkey’s military weapons and technology when Turkey 
faced increased difficulties in obtaining sophisticated weapons from the US due 
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to opposition from anti-Turkish ethnic lobbies and human rights groups in the 
Congress. Other than these principal purposes, additional considerations, such 
as intelligence sharing with Israel against the PKK, joint struggle opposed to 
terrorism and support from the Jewish lobby in Washington, also shaped 
Turkey's policy on Turkish-Israeli relations. By the end of the 1990s, the 
commercial and cultural ties between the region's two non-Arab, democratic and 
pro-Western states increased outstandingly as a result of military and security 
cooperation.44  
 
 1.2.3. Caution and Concern in the Caucasus and Central Asia:  
Another region where Turkey pursued an activist foreign policy was the 
post-Soviet South. Turkish policymakers, who had been looking for a new role 
for Turkey in the new era, viewed the dissolution of the Soviet Union as an 
important occasion, and the Caucasus and Central Asia became the center of 
Turkey’s diplomatic efforts, reaching the highest point in the early 1990s. As 
Öniş asserted, the emergence of the Turkic Republics helped Turkey to break its 
sense of political and cultural isolation that originated from being neither Arab 
nor fully European.45 Turkey tried to take advantage of its strong cultural and 
linguistic ties with the new independent states, quite the opposite of its Cold 
War policies, and became one of the first countries to recognize the new 
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republics. Particularly, Turkey began to build independent ties to the Turkic-
language states, initiated the organization of annual summits involving the 
presidents of Turkic Republics and Turkey, established air routes from Istanbul, 
started to transmit television broadcasts to the region, developed large 
scholarship programs for thousands of students to study in Turkish universities, 
trained Central Asian and Azerbaijani diplomats, and, of course, searched for 
regional commercial opportunities.46  
Moreover, Turkey had been promoted as a model for the Turkish 
Republics by the West in the early 1990s. The ‘Turkish Model’ was used to 
describe the characteristics of being secular in nature with a predominantly 
Muslim population, having a multi-party system with a parliamentary democracy 
and having a market-oriented economy and pro-Western values. The model was 
projected to these states as a guide for their transition. And the Turkic republics 
turned to Ankara as their mediator in integrating into the international political 
and economic system with the expectation of benefiting from Ankara’s close ties 
with the US. Turkish policymakers, meanwhile, believed that closer ties with the 
new republics would improve Turkey's regional role, present Turkey new 
economic and business opportunities and prevent Russia and Iran from 
expanding their influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The possible 
alternatives to the ‘Turkish Model’ appeared to be an Islamic-based Iranian 
model or a return to Russian domination.47 
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On the other hand, Turkish foreign policy in the post-Cold War era had 
another aspect that revolved around the cooperation axis. With the hope of 
playing a strategic role in international politics through cooperation with 
surrounding countries, Turkey led the formation of the Black Sea Economic 
Cooperation Organization (BSEC). The aim was to promote regional economic 
cooperation and as a result peace, stability, security and prosperity in the area. 
Turkey also played a leading role in the formation of a Naval Task Force for the 
Black Sea (Blackseafor) that would respond to emergencies and environmental 
disasters. The Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) was another 
organization that Turkey has been a participant.48         
But Turkey’s efforts to expand its regional influence and to play a 
leadership role in the region came across some impediments. To begin with, the 
newly independent Republics were suspicious of Turkey’s domination as an 
‘elder brother’ and were in favor of more limited and equal relationship. There 
was also a considerable amount of Russian influence on the region causing the 
local leaders to consider the pressures and dangers coming from Moscow. 
Turkey’s limited financial capacity and economic difficulties were also added to 
the previous ones. From the Western point of view, the ‘Turkish Model’ seemed 
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to lose its significance after the realization that initial fears regarding Iran’s 
influence had been exaggerated.49  
The Caspian region has emerged as one of the largest energy supplies. 
The beliefs of the Turkish policymakers that the proposed East-West energy 
corridor for the transportation of Caspian oil and natural gas to Western markets 
would increase Turkey’s strategic importance shaped Ankara’s search for a 
greater regional role. So, Turkey became intensely involved in competition for 
the construction of pipelines and offered, the most direct, cost-effective in the 
long-run, technologically and environmentally feasible and safe option, namely 
the Bakü-Ceyhan pipeline, from the Caspian basin to the Mediterranean coasts 
of Turkey. However, the outbreak of ethnic and secessionist conflicts in 
Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgia and Chechnya boosted Turkish concerns about their 
negative influence on stability and energy security in the region. As a result of a 
number of developments, Turkish policy makers exercised caution in their 
relations in the region despite their initial activism.50  
In order to understand the reasons of Turkey’s cautious behavior, one 
should focus on Turkish-Russian relations. The economic relations between 
Turkey and the Russian Federation improved considerably in the 1990s. Despite 
the deepening relations in merely economic terms, overall relations between the 
two countries in the post-Cold War era have been characterized by significant 
friction and conflict. Immediately after the collapse of the USSR, through the 
early post-Cold War period, the Russian Federation primarily focused on internal 
problems of reconstruction and reform. But following 1993, Moscow gradually 
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concentrated on gaining hegemony again in the ‘near abroad’, namely the area 
ruled by the former Soviet republics. The basic aim behind the Russian policy 
toward its ‘near abroad’ was to keep the other countries like Turkey and Iran 
away from interfering in the region and Turkey was regarded as a greater threat 
than Iran, given Ankara’s more assertive approach toward a number of former 
Soviet republics because of the aforementioned reasons. Frictions between the 
two countries had been worsened by the appearance of the pipeline 
competition. Russia was strongly opposing the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline project and 
sought pipelines that travel through its territory to assure its regional hegemony 
in addition to the financial profits. As well, the attitudes of the two countries 
regarding each other’s internal politics have also been a factor on rising tensions 
and instability. Turkey criticized Russian actions in Chechnya, influenced by its 
population who sympathized with their ethnic kindred in the area. However, 
Russia provided support over a long time for the Kurdish separatist movement in 
Turkey.51 
Despite the fact that Turkey has not been sharing a border with Russia 
since the end of the Cold War, Ankara continued to view Russia with concern. 
The traditional Turkish-Russian rivalry, which has deep historical roots going 
back many centuries, contributed to Turkey’s uneasiness, and supported worries 
about Moscow as a geo-political competitor and a source of regional risk. 
Despite the pressure from domestic sources, especially the public, Turkey 
refrained from getting involved militarily in the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict on the 
Azerbaijani side in the early 1990s. Turkey preferred to implement caution 
rather than challenge or risk in the ethnic conflicts in the Caucasus that could 
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have brought it into a major conflict with Russia. In addition, the secessionist 
movements in Chechnya and Georgia had effects on Turkey's own Kurdish 
separatist problem. Ankara did not want to be in an unpleasant position of 
suppressing separatism at home while supporting it near its borders.52 
 
 1.2.4. Multilateral Activism in the Balkans:  
There was a visible increase in Turkey's interest and involvement in the 
Balkans in the aftermath of the Cold War when compared to its relations in the 
previous era. This was a result of several regional developments. To start with, 
the disintegration of Yugoslavia, and following violent ethnic and nationalistic 
conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo, damaged regional stability. This also created a 
possibility that a major conflict could spread to Turkey. Another important 
development was that ethnic conflicts in the region resulted in a widespread 
attention and concern in Turkey because of the people who had ethnic ties to 
the region and had migrated from the various parts of the Balkans to Turkey 
over the years. Furthermore, Turkish-Greek rivalry and competition for regional 
political and economic influence was also a reason for Turkey's efforts to pursue 
a more assertive role in Balkan affairs in the post-Cold War era. Additionally, the 
overlapping policy objectives of the US and Turkey in the regional security issues 
became influential in assisting greater Turkish activism through multilateral, 
including participation in international peacekeeping operations, rather than 
unilateral, initiatives.53  
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Initially, Turkey remained totally committed to the protection of the unity 
and the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, and criticized EU policies that 
appeared to encourage this process. Besides Ankara’s worry about the potential 
for the escalation of regional tensions, Turkish policymakers opposed the 
fragmentation of Yugoslavia due to the concerns at home about its own 
territorial integrity on the face of the PKK-led insurgency, as with the 
secessionist movements in the Caucasus. However, Turkey’s attitude changed as 
the circumstances altered. As the Bosnian war began and the Serbian ethnic 
cleansing policy against the Bosnian Muslims intensified, Turkey came out as an 
active player in support of Bosnia, and began to apply pressure for a strong 
Western response to stop the Serbian atrocities.54 Ankara continuously urged its 
Western allies to take a determined stance to end the war quickly. Turkey was 
critical of the Western, especially the European powers’ equivocation on the 
Bosnian crisis, and was in favor of launching a military intervention by NATO and 
imposing strong sanctions against Belgrade. Despite its sometimes aggressive 
rhetoric, Turkish policy makers cautiously avoided any single-handed activities 
and always made their policy parallel with the multilateral track. Exceptionally a 
member of both NATO and the Islamic Conference Organization (ICO), Turkey 
played a role in convincing NATO to step up its pressure on Serbia. So Turkey 
appreciated the US-led effort to end the violence through the Dayton Peace 
Agreement in 1995, and participated in the multilateral UN peacekeeping forces 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina.55 
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Turkey's multilateral policy application in the Balkans continued with the 
escalation of the Kosovo conflict in 1998. Ankara's approach to the conflict 
between the Kosovar Albanians and the Serbs was remarkably more calm and 
controlled due to Turkey’s opposition to secessionist movements and because of 
the concerns of the Turkish minority in Kosovo about being dominated by the 
Albanian majority. However, Turkey acquiesced to NATO's decision to use 
sanctions against Belgrade and contributed to both NATO's air campaign and 
subsequent UN peacekeeping forces in Kosovo.56  
Until 1993, Turkish troops had not served outside of Turkey with the 
exception of Korea and Cyprus. But later, it has become an enthusiastic 
participant in multilateral peacekeeping operations both in its immediate region 
and distant. Since 1993, Turkish forces have participated in many peacekeeping 
and peace-enforcement operations such as those in Somalia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Albania, Kosovo, Georgia, Hebron (TIPH), Kuwait (the UN Iraq-
Kuwait Observation Mission), Macedonia, and Pakistan (training Afghan refugees 
on mine-clearing). 57 
Turkey gave importance to the building of closer ties among the Balkan 
countries and to the creation of a stable atmosphere of understanding and 
peaceful cohabitation. It established working relations with all the states of the 
former Yugoslavia, including Serbia, developed close ties with Muslim Albania 
and with Macedonia. Turkey has launched major initiatives such as the 
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Southeastern European Cooperation Process (SEECP), and the Multinational 
Peacekeeping Force for Southeastern Europe.58 
 
1.3. Conclusion:   
Turkey's activist foreign policy course in the 1990s was encouraged by a 
variety of factors. The upsurge of political instability, war and ethnic conflict in 
the vicinity of Turkey, in the Middle East, the Caucasus and the Balkans, 
stimulated Ankara to become involved in these regions. Also, Turkish 
policymakers’ efforts to show their country’s geo-strategic importance to the 
West in the new era were effective in this course. Furthermore, some internal 
and external factors facilitated Turkey's efforts to expand its regional 
involvement. The economic progress of Turkey together with the modernization 
of its military, while its neighboring states experienced severe weaknesses in 
military power have been important factors in Turkey's ability to follow pro-
active and assertive policies on issues of vital national interest. The changing 
dynamics of the country’s foreign policy making, namely the increased influence 
of the President and public opinion, were also effectual. 
At the same time, post-Cold War developments such as the emergence of 
the Turkic republics in Central Asia, the Gulf War, and Caspian energy 
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developments have created new opportunities for Turkey to play a larger role in 
several areas, while also giving Turkish policymakers self-confidence.      
Turkey's main objectives have been to preserve its geo-strategic 
importance on the international scene, maintain stability in its neighboring 
regions, prevent ethnic conflicts from spreading to its territory, and gain new 
markets for its economic growth. But Turkish policymakers, while trying to reach 
their goals, carried out balanced policies between activism and caution. 
To remind, undoubtedly, Turkish foreign policy in the 1990s was 
considerably more activist and self-confident in the Middle East, the Balkans, the 
Caucasus and Central Asia. On the other hand, this did not mean to give up the 
traditional Turkish approach to international and regional affairs that can be 
described as moderate and cautious. Especially the Middle East has become the 
region that Turkey's active and assertive foreign policy practices are most 
profoundly seen. As Criss and Bilgin stated, Turkish foreign policy towards the 
Middle East has always been regarded as an extension of its pro-Western 
foreign policy. But, when compared to the major turning points of Turkish 
foreign policy, namely Turkey’s participation in NATO in 1952, and its new 
course of developing multilateral relations after the mid-1960s, Turkey’s 
assertive and active policy in the new era has to be regarded as the continuation 
of its traditional orientation, rather than a change. Whether it will stay on this 
course remains to be seen.59 
 
 
                                                 
59 Nur Bilge Criss, Pınar Bilgin, “Turkish Foreign Policy Toward the Middle East.”, Middle East 
Review of International Affairs, 1:1, (January 1997). 
 34 
CHAPTER 2 
TURKISH-U.S. RELATIONS: REDEFINITION OF TURKEY’S STRATEGIC 
SIGNIFICANCE 
  
2.1. Cold War Origins of the Turkish-U.S. Relations 
The arrival of the U.S. warship, SS Missouri in Istanbul, in April 1946, is 
often referred to as the symbolic event indicating the start of the bilateral 
relationship between Turkey and the United States. But even before, in the early 
1920s, during the Turkish War of Liberation, Turkish leaders had sought U.S. 
cooperation attempting to counterbalance Britain in the region. However, 
because of the American policy of isolationism and lack of their interest in the 
area, official relations between the two countries did not even start until 1927.60 
Prior to 1945, the United States had been supporting Soviet demands to revise 
the Montreux Convention of 1936 regarding the Turkish Straits, a situation 
extremely worrisome for Turkish policy-makers. The situation deteriorated when 
Moscow abrogated the Turkish-Soviet Treaty of Neutrality and Nonaggression of 
1925 and demanded the return of Kars and Ardahan provinces, as well as joint 
control of military bases along the Istanbul (Bosphorus) and Çanakkale 
(Dadanelles) Straits.61   
However, when the United States realized the expansionist policy of the 
Soviet Union, Turkey's geo-strategic importance turned out to be an invaluable 
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asset for U.S. policy. The USS Missouri was conveying home the body of the late 
Turkish Ambassador to the U.S. who had died in Washington, DC, but its 
presence also served another purpose, to emphasize to the Soviet Union and to 
other nations the United States’ support to Turkey against Soviet pressure and 
its concern about political instability in the region. Following the visit, Turkish-
U.S. relations started and Turkey benefited from both the Truman Doctrine of 
1947 and the Marshall Plan launched the following year. Then, especially with 
Turkey's contribution in the Korean War on the U.S.-led UN forces side, the 
United States supported Turkey's membership to NATO in 1952. During the 
following Cold War years, the two countries developed a close strategic 
relationship despite some fluctuations.62 
Turkey and the United States raised their relations to the level of alliance 
with Turkey’s membership to NATO and maintained their political and military 
relations in the NATO framework. What were the reasons for this alliance from 
both U.S. and Turkish perspective? From the Turkish point of view, there were 
three basic reasons. The first one was to ensure the country’s security. As a 
result of Moscow’s expansionist policy and territorial demands from Turkey in 
the aftermath of World War II, as mentioned above, Turkey began to regard the 
Soviet Union as a threat to its security. These events forced the Turkish leaders 
to seek U.S. military and diplomatic support against that threat. Another reason 
was Turkey’s need for military and economic assistance. Efforts of modernizing 
its military and strengthening its economy were factors effecting Turkey’s 
course. The third reason was about the ideological dimension of this alliance. 
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While emphasizing their country’s democratic, secular and pro-Western 
characteristics, Turkish leaders considered the alliance as a means for their 
westernization project. Related to this fact is that the Turkish government, as of 
1950, saw NATO membership as insurance for continuity in democracy. That is, 
since NATO would only embrace democratic countries. From the U.S. viewpoint, 
Turkey’s geo-strategic importance was the main reason for the alliance. They 
saw Turkey as a barrier against Soviet expansionism toward the Middle East. 
Besides, the country had invaluable properties such as the Straits, numerically 
high armed forces, and the military bases which made it inalienable. That is to 
say, American leaders were mostly interested in preserving their interests.63 
During the 1950s and the early 1960s, Turkish-American relations were in 
perfect harmony. These early years of the Cold War can be described as a 
‘golden age’.64 Both countries were satisfied with one another. From 
Washington’s perspective, Turkey was an effective ally for the Western interests 
in the Middle East. For Ankara, on the other hand, the U.S. was a necessary 
element guaranteeing Turkey’s security and development. Turkish leaders gave 
so much importance to the alliance that Turkey supported and voted for all U.S. 
decisions in the United Nations and other international organizations. Ankara 
played the leading role in the formation of the Baghdad Pact in 1955, which was 
an extension of the U.S. containment policy in the Middle East, that later caused 
Turkey’s alienation from the Arab world.65 During the Suez Crisis of 1956, 
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Turkey supported U.S. attitude rather than backing the UK, its Baghdad Pact 
ally.66 After the crisis, Ankara, again, gave unconditional support to the 
Eisenhower doctrine of defending the Middle Eastern states against the 
communist threat.67 Furthermore, although the US forces used Incirlik air base 
without informing Turkish staff beforehand, Turkey still supported U.S. 
intervention in Lebanon in 1958. The military coup of May 27, 1960 did not have 
a negative effect on Turkish-American relations initially, and Turkey maintained 
its support to the determined U.S. attitude in the Cuban crisis.68 
The 1962 Cuban missile crisis, in which Washington decided to remove 
nuclear-capable Jupiter missiles based in Turkey in exchange of U.S.S.R.’s 
withdrawal of Soviet missiles in Cuba, was an important event in the course of 
Turkish-American relations. This event fostered doubt in the minds of the 
Turkish elites about the U.S. commitment to Turkish security. But İsmet İnönü 
the then-Prime Minister of Turkey handled the impacts of the crisis in as low a 
profile as possible. The crisis served to widen the gap between the Right and 
the Left. From that time, the relationship between the two countries has 
experienced intermittent reverses.69 
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The 1961 constitution provided freedom for the press, created an 
opportunity for the public opinion to be articulated and foreign policy began to 
be debated for the first time. The most important event which inspired a 
sensation of anti-Americanism and questioning of NATO membership, though 
not at the state level, was American policy during the Cyprus crises of 1963-
1964. When Turkey decided to intervene in the island with the aim of protecting 
and guaranteeing the security of the Turkish Cypriot community during the bi-
communal violence in Cyprus, U.S. president Lyndon Johnson sent his infamous 
letter of 1964, warning Turkey to halt preparations for an intervention and 
threatened Turkey not to trust NATO protection if Soviets were involved in the 
conflict. The crisis further strained the relations between Turkey and the United 
States. The relaxation of Cold War tensions, détente, was another factor in 
Turkey’s course. Turkish policy makers realized that Turkey’s security interests 
and those of its allies were not necessarily in accord. Then, they began to 
reorient their foreign policy away from excessive dependence on the United 
States, and started a rapprochement with Moscow.70 
After establishing more friendly relations with the Soviet Union in the 
mid-1960s, Turkish policymakers made some foreign policy decisions contrary to 
the desires of the United States. During the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars, 
Ankara did not allow the United States to use the bases in Turkey. But Turkey’s 
foreign policy decisions were not totally opposed to the United States. In both 
wars the Americans were permitted to use the bases as communication stations. 
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Besides, the Americans carried out the evacuation operations from these bases 
during the Jordanian civil war in 1970 and the Iranian revolution in 1979.71  
During the 1967 Cyprus crisis, the United States tended to follow a policy 
of supporting Turkey’s situation. But later, another problem emerged as a 
source of disagreement between the two countries. Washington applied 
pressure on Ankara to cease the production of opium poppies, which the U.S. 
administration had concluded was a major source of the heroin that was illegally 
entering the United States. The above-party government, following the 1971 
‘coup-by-memorandum’, accepted American demands and banned opium 
farming. Cultivation was resumed in 1974, by the new government, with new 
regulations designed to restrict the illegal drug traffic.72      
Turkish-U.S. relations reached a low point in the mid-1970s, when the 
United States placed an embargo on arms supplies to Turkey. In 1974, after a 
coup staged against President Makarios with the aim of ridding the island of 
Turkish Cypriots and of forming union with Greece, Turkish troops intervened 
and undertook military operations. Then the US Congress imposed an arms 
embargo on Turkey in 1975, in response to the country's military operations. 
The Turkish government retaliated by suspending operations at all American-
occupied installations in Turkey that were not clearly connected with NATO 
missions, and abrogated the 1969 Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA). 
Later, the embargo was lifted in 1978.73 
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During negotiations over this issue, a new dynamic, which would 
continue to affect Turkish-U.S. relations in later years, became obvious. 
Whereas the executive branch of the United States government tended to have 
some sympathy for Turkey's position during the Cyprus crisis, and was not in 
favor of an embargo, the attitude of the Congress became increasingly 
unfavorable. After the Congress agreed to lift the arms embargo in 1978, the 
Ecevit government allowed resumption of operations at the United States 
facilities in Turkey.74 
Developments by the end of the 1970s, namely the Iranian Revolution 
and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, led Turkish policymakers to reassess ties 
with the United States. The two countries' ongoing strategic need for one 
another surfaced again as a result of abovementioned developments. In March 
1980, Washington and Ankara reached compromises and signed the US-Turkish 
Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA).75 After the coup of 
September 12, 1980, the military regime followed policies that were not 
different from the previous ones; moreover, it facilitated the improvement of 
Turkish-U.S. relations. The Americans, unlike the Europeans, did not criticize the 
military regime so much, due to the promise of returning back to democracy. 
They were also pleased with the fact that the coup had brought stability to the 
country, which was in the best interest of the Americans. In spite of the new 
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sense of cooperation between the two countries in the 1980s, there were still 
some conflicting issues. Turkish leaders were never fully satisfied with the 
amount of American military and economic assistance. They were not pleased 
with the 7:10 ratio of military aid allocation to Turkey and Greece. They also 
resented the Greek and Armenian lobbies that worked against Turkey in the 
Congress. The Americans, in the meantime, were discontented with Ankara’s 
decision to give limited access to the American bases in Turkey. Plus, they were 
displeased with the declaration of an independent Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus and Turkey’s recognition of this country. But, as a result, American 
leaders continued to attach great strategic importance to Turkey during the 
1980s.76  
 
2.2. Effects of the End of the Cold War on Turkish-U.S. Relations: 
The United States vacated most of its military bases in Turkey with the 
end of the Cold War. The U.S. decision was welcomed by the Turkish 
government because of domestic political reasons but the bases had been seen 
as a symbol of U.S. commitment to Turkey and Ankara realized that this decision 
has left Turkey without an important source of leverage over the United States. 
But more importantly, the Cold War’s end itself created discomfort in the minds 
of the Turkish policymakers about the continuation of the strategic importance 
of their country in the eyes of its Western allies in the new era.77 
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The Gulf War, as mentioned earlier, became a watershed in terms of 
Turkish-American perceptions of the bilateral relationship. It gave Turkey an 
opportunity to reassert its geopolitical significance to the West in general, and to 
the United States in particular. Turkey became one of the first countries to ally 
with the United States in opposition to the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in August 
1990, and joined the United Nations coalition. Besides, Ankara let the Americans 
to use Incirlik airbase, the only remaining major U.S./NATO military base of 
strategic and military importance in Turkey, to launch air operations to bomb 
Iraq. The close cooperation between Turkey and the United States during the 
Gulf War was followed by the strengthened relations between the two countries 
in the aftermath of the crisis.78 
The Gulf War demonstrated to the American policy-makers that Turkey 
could play an important strategic role outside the European area. Operation 
Provide Comfort (OPC) began as a humanitarian mission soon after the Gulf 
War, but shifted into an element of U.S. policy of containing and weakening 
Saddam Hussein.79 OPC/ONW, based on Incirlik, became a chief and strong 
element in Turkish-American relations, and gave Turkey a new leverage on 
American foreign policy.80 
Turkey’s various strategic roles in the post-Cold War era were broadly 
realized by the United States. Turkey has been the sole example of secularism 
and democracy with its predominantly Muslim population, a pro-Western state in 
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an area of instability, a supporter of Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and an 
important contributor to a possible normalization of Israeli-Muslim relations 
worldwide, a key element of Washington’s Iraq strategy, and a base for 
Operation Northern Watch. In addition, Turkey has been a model, to some 
extent, for the Turkic Republics of the former Soviet Union, a bridge and line of 
communication between the region and the West, a buffer against possible 
Russian aggression toward the south, a rival against Russia for influence over 
the Caucasus and Central Asia, an ideological counterweight against 
fundamentalist Iran, an alternative to Russia and Iran as a possible gateway for 
Caspian energy resources, a powerful but peaceful supporter of besieged 
Muslims in its area, namely Azerbaijan, Chechnya, Bosnia and Kosovo, and a 
participant in Balkan peacekeeping.81  
A close convergence of Turkish and American national interests existed in 
the post-Cold War era as it was the case during the Cold War years. This time 
the matter was no longer to restrain Soviet expansionism, but to ensure 
security, stability and prosperity in the Middle East, the Balkans and former 
Soviet Union republics.82 In this new period Turkey obtained a unique position 
with its location at the center of regions that could affect the world system. 
Turkey was “…an island of safety in the middle of a sea of instability”.83 
Location means a potential for regional influence, but does not guarantee 
it. This geographic approach is a foundation concerning projection of military 
                                                 
81 Alan Makovsky, “US Policy toward Turkey: Progress and Problems”, in Morton Abramowitz 
(ed.), Turkey’s Transformation and American Policy, (New York: The Century Foundation Press, 
2000), pp. 221-222. 
82 Meltem Müftüler, "Turkey’s New Vocation”, Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, 
22:3, (Spring 1999), p.15. 
83 Nasuh Uslu, “1947’den Günümüze Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerinin Genel Portresi”, (The General 
Description of Turkish-American Relations from 1947 to the present), Avrasya Dosyası, 6:2, 
(Yaz2000), p.223. [Author’s translation] 
 44 
power, lines of communication for resources and trade.84 Turkey has been 
described as a ‘pivotal state’. In addition to an important geographical location, 
key requirements are population and economic potential (military power might 
be added) for pivot status, and Turkey clearly qualifies by these measures. This 
outstanding pivot state position of Turkey also contributed to the improvement 
of Turkish-American relations in the post-Cold War era.85 
In order to prevent confusion among the terms or concepts used in 
international relations, it will be helpful to clarify some of them. There are some 
terms, like, relationship, dialogue, cooperation, alliance, partnership etc. joined 
with many different adjectives, like, enhanced, special, strategic etc. Sean Kay, 
in his study, explains the term ‘strategic partnership’, which has been used to 
describe the relationship between Turkey and the United States, and he focuses 
on the two countries. After Turkey’s membership to NATO, the two countries 
raised their relations to the level of alliance, which is described as “…a 
commitment by two or more states to provide one another with security 
guarantees in the event of an external threat or actual aggression.” In recent 
years, Ankara and Washington began to characterize their bilateral relationship 
as a strategic partnership which “…enhances or justifies a close relationship 
between two states that seek mutual gains but whose interests may be 
competitive rather than shared.” According to Kay, the phrase has been used to 
strengthen and broaden the Turkish-U.S. alliance and to emphasize a variety of 
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shared long-term interests.86 To make a broader summary, after being allies 
throughout the Cold War years, with the nature of the relations almost 
exclusively based on military cooperation, the two countries improved their 
relations in the post Cold War era while more explosive problems emerged. A 
new concept called ‘enhanced partnership’ was introduced in 1991, intended for 
expanding, deepening and developing the Turkish-American relationship. Later, 
in 1997, Ankara and Washington settled on formulating their mutual cooperation 
under a ‘five part agenda’, with the topics of energy, economy and trade, 
regional cooperation, Cyprus, and defense and security cooperation. In 1999, 
high level visits between the two countries, including presidents of both 
countries, paved the way for further enhancement of the relations. As of 
September 1999, the relationship between Turkey and the U.S. has been termed 
as ‘strategic partnership’.87      
 
2.3. The Areas of Divergence and Convergence: 
 2.3.1. Caucasus and Central Asia, Russia, Energy Security, 
Regional Economic Development  
A key point of convergence between the United States and Turkey, 
regarding the Caucasus and Central Asia, was that both have supported the 
emergence of democratic, secular, pro-Western regimes in the area and wanted 
to prevent the rebuilding of a Soviet/Russian Empire. Turkey was one of the first 
countries to recognize former Soviet republics and to support dynamically new 
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regimes in Turkic republics, as well as Georgia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Macedonia 
and even Armenia, although it did not establish diplomatic relations with the 
latter.88 In the early 1990s, Turkey’s secularism, democracy, and market-
oriented economy have been seen as a model of development for the Turkic 
republics of the former Soviet Union, which would have improved Turkey’s 
international image and developed its relations with the West. But, as noted 
before, because of several reasons, such as, the lack of Turkey’s financial means 
and resources, Russia’s durable influence in the region, reluctance of the 
Republics to have a new ‘big brother’, and lack of their enthusiasm for the 
‘Turkish model”, Turkey’s efforts to expand its influence in the region proved to 
be limited. In addition, despite the inflated U.S. rhetoric, Washington’s political 
and financial support has never materialized.89 
On the subject of Russia, there has been a fundamental inconsistency in 
Turkish-Russian relations, in the post-Soviet era. The two countries have 
competed for regional influence in the new Eurasia which constituted a potential 
source of instability. On the other hand, wide-ranging economic relations 
between them created a remarkable bilateral partnership atmosphere which has 
generated significant Turkish-Russian interdependence and potential opportunity 
for reaching mutual trust. In the post-Cold War era, Turkey and Russia have 
mostly had conflicting interests. While Russia sided with the Serbs, Turkey has 
backed the Muslims of Bosnia and Kosovo in the Yugoslavia crisis, but this never 
became an issue between Turkey and Russia. Improved relations between 
Greeks, Greek Cypriots, and Russians created the impression of an evolving anti-
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Turkish entente, while Russian sale of S-300 missiles to Greek Cypriots was 
another source of concern whereas the issue was resolved, as will be noted in 
the following paragraphs. Turkey and Russia were also on opposite sides of the 
Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. Besides, Turkey’s unilateral decree on traffic 
regulations in the Straits, Russia’s claim of Turkey’s support to the Chechens, 
Russia’s noncompliance with the permitted ceilings of the treaty on Conventional 
Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) in the northern Caucasus, rivalry on Caspian Sea 
energy routes, question of granting political asylum to Abdullah Öcalan after his 
expulsion from Syria along with Russia’s manipulation of Turkey’s PKK problem, 
and the hijacking of the Turkish ferry Avrasya to protest Russia’s Chechen policy 
were sources of tensions affecting Turkish-Russian relations. Economic relations 
between the two countries, in contrast, have been a remarkable achievement 
where three major areas have been trade, tourism, and construction.90 
One important development in the post-Cold War era was that NATO put 
the Partnership for Peace (PFP) project into practice to connect Russia with the 
Western defense system. Turkish leaders have attached great importance to the 
process of both keeping their traditional rival under the control of multilateral 
Western defense structure through Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) process and Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty, and 
relating Russia to the Western defense system. Both Turkey and the United 
States, have also believed that Ukraine was of great importance to Western 
security and agreed on dwelling upon the independence of that country to 
prevent Russian expansionism. Russia, as an important economic partner of 
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Turkey on the one hand and a rival for regional influence on the other, was a 
country that Ankara remained cautious toward. For both Turkey and the United 
States, Russia’s deepening influence in the region, attempts for taking the 
energy resources under its control, and its cooperation efforts with anti-Western 
Iran were sources of worry. However, Russia has also had some problems, such 
as economic crisis, and domestic ethnic problems, which lessens its ability to 
control the region.91 
Both Ankara and Washington were cautious about Russia but Ankara was 
made even more cautious by the fact that it could not define the agenda for 
Russia’s relations with the West. From the Turkish point of view, U.S. policy 
toward Moscow was too soft and should be tougher. It has been obvious that in 
an event of an unexpected or sudden deterioration in strategic relations 
between the West and Russia, Turkey would once again play a critical 
containment role. In contrast to the growing economic relations with that 
country, Turkish leaders were cautious about the potential for a renewed 
Russian military threat to Western interests.92 For Turkish leaders, more 
optimistic approaches of the American leaders to Russia, when compared to 
Turkey, were a disturbing issue. Some Turks also believed that the U.S. 
contributed to the strengthening of Russian influence in the region by closing its 
eyes to Russian imperialism.93 
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Turkey’s worries about a resurgence of Russian aggression, highlighted 
by Russia’s war on Chechnya, its threatening efforts toward Georgia and 
Azerbaijan, and its deployment of military equipment in southern Caucasus in 
excess of the permitted ceilings of the 1990 CFE treaty. The U.S. permitted 
Russian request to relax the CFE treaty restrictions and the agreement was 
modified in Russia’s favor in 1999. Turkey initially opposed any revision but 
changed its stance when Russia dropped its demand for removal of all Article V 
ceilings. 94 While the West was closing its eyes to Russia’s actions in the 
Caucasus, and permitting its failure to limit its forces in accordance with the CFE 
treaty, Russia ceased to oppose NATO’s expansion toward the east including the 
Baltic States.95 This created a discord in the minds of Turkish leaders. According 
to one prominent Turkish scholar, “… failure to address Moscow’s aggression [in 
the Caucasus and Central Asia] betrays Washington’s ‘Russia-first’ sentiments, 
leaving its dedication to the U.S.-Turkish partnership in question for many 
policymakers in Ankara.” 96 
Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict—the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute— and 
Ankara’s limited reaction was an example of restrictions created by Turkey’s 
relations with the United States. Turkey tried not to offend its Western allies, 
refused to sign a defense pact with Azerbaijan and despite President Özal’s 
proposal, did not intervene in the conflict. Russia, in contrast, has taken active 
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steps, and backed Yerevan against Baku.97 Turkey’s relations with Armenia were 
not crucial to Turkish-U.S. bilateral relations; Washington has encouraged 
Ankara to open its land border with Armenia that it had closed in response to 
Armenia’s occupation of Azerbaijani territory and wanted Turkey to help Armenia 
reduce its dependence on Russia. Ankara, in fact under the influence of Baku, 
has kept it closed and Turkey would probably maintain its stance unless Armenia 
withdraw from the territories it had occupied.98 
As mentioned before, to prevent the increase of Russian political or 
military influence in the region was a common concern for both Turkey and the 
United States. An important instrument for that was to develop an energy 
corridor, oil and gas pipelines, which went through Turkey in preference to 
Russia. Both countries agreed on the development of alternative pipeline routes 
to existing Russian ones bringing Caspian and Central Asian oil and gas to the 
world markets. However, there was some divergence over the preferred actual 
routing of pipelines. Washington supported multiple routes including on from 
Baku to Ceyhan, and Ankara supported this route with much more enthusiasm. 
This route, Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, would enhance Turkey’s regional importance at 
the expense of Russia’s and Iran’s, and strengthen the independence of 
Azerbaijan and Georgia to loosen their dependence on Russia. While Washington 
was supporting the route but stating that it must be commercially viable, Ankara 
was paying less attention to the commercial or economic factors and feeling that 
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the U.S. did not throw its full weight behind the pipeline.99 On the other hand, 
the Blue Stream project, to supply Russian gas to Turkey by an underwater 
pipeline in the Black Sea, in which Italy and Japan were also involved, conflicted 
with a U.S. backed project, the Trans-Caspian Pipeline (TCP) to carry 
Turkmenistani gas to Turkey via the Caspian, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. In fact 
Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan never agreed on the price and Turkey could not 
wait. The U.S. opposed Blue Stream and feared that Turkey would be too much 
dependent on Russia. But Turkey had already relied on Russian gas but had not 
taken pro-Russian attitude on regional issues.100    
Both Turkey and the United States saw the region’s Turkic Republics’ 
entrance in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 
NATO's Partnership for Peace program (PFP), and North Atlantic Cooperation 
Council as critical to strengthening a new geopolitics in the ex-Soviet field of 
influence. Concerning regional economic development, the two countries 
seemed to support similar approaches. Turkey played an active role in 
promoting closer cooperation in the Black Sea region. Initiated by Turkey, Black 
Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) was designed to strengthen stability and 
security in the region by promoting private sector activity and stimulating the 
free movement of goods and services among member states. The United States 
gave this idea significant support and important institutional progress was 
achieved.101  
                                                 
99 Kemal Kirişçi, “Turkey and the United States: Ambivalent Allies”, MERIA, 2:4 (November 1998), 
p.20. 
100 Alan Makovsky, “US Policy toward Turkey: Progress and Problems”, in Morton Abramowitz 
(ed.), Turkey’s Transformation and American Policy, (New York: The Century Foundation Press, 
2000), pp.242. 
101 Kemal Kirişçi, “Turkey and the United States: Ambivalent Allies”, MERIA, 2:4 (November 
1998), p.20. 
 52 
 2.3.2. Balkans, Greece and Cyprus 
Ankara and Washington have also closely cooperated in the Balkans. Both 
Turkey and the United States shared same ideas about the need for peace, 
stability and economic development in the region. Turkish policy toward the 
Balkans has been mostly harmonious with U.S. interests and preferences. As 
mentioned earlier, Turkey has followed an active policy toward the region, tried 
to normalize its relations with significant neighbors, such as Bulgaria, adopted a 
multilateral approach to regional security, took part in IFOR, SFOR and KFOR; 
by leading the formation of multinational peacekeeping force for the Balkans, 
and by permitting the use of its airbases in Thrace.102 
All of Turkey’s Balkan neighbors, with the exception of Greece, had been 
ruled by communist governments for about half a century and an active Turkish 
engagement had been limited as a consequence of the cold war system. 
Therefore, the end of the Cold War strongly affected the place of the Balkans in 
Turkish foreign policy priorities and Ankara sought to improve its relations with 
the region. Plus, with the beginning of the Bosnian war, the Balkans obtained a 
top priority in the minds of the Turkish policymakers and it became a region 
where an activist Turkish foreign policy has taken place. Turkey chose to act in 
accordance with the international community during different Balkan crises and 
became active in various regional multilateral cooperation efforts. Although 
some Balkan leaders stated that Turkey, as the heir of the Ottoman Empire, 
should stay out of Balkan affairs, Turkish national interests require it to be active 
in the region to control elements of instability in the area that connects the 
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country with Western Europe. Besides, a considerable part of Turkey’s 
population has family bonds with various parts of the region.103 
As the Bosnian war began, Turkey came out as an active player in 
support of Bosnia, and began to apply pressure for a strong Western response 
to take a determined stance to end the war quickly. Turkey was in favor of 
launching a military intervention against the Serbian side by NATO and lifting 
the U.N. arms embargo in favor of the Bosnians. This position placed Turkey 
against its European allies, and for the short term also created disagreement 
with the American administration. But the developments led to determined 
military reaction in the first half of 1995, and Ankara felt itself relieved with the 
justification of its policy. Turkish troops participated in the United Nations 
Protection Force (UNPROFOR), and appreciated the US-led effort to end the 
violence through the Dayton Peace Agreement in December 1995.104 Turkish 
units then became part of the NATO forces deployed in Bosnia, the 
Implementation Force (IFOR) and the follow-on Stabilization Force (SFOR), to 
implement the military aspects of Dayton Peace Accords. Then, Ankara played a 
key role in training the Muslim army in Bosnia under the U.S.-led “equip and 
train” program.105 
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Turkey's multilateral approach and participation in peacekeeping missions 
continued with the escalation of the Kosovo conflict in 1998. Although, Ankara's 
approach to the conflict between the Kosovar Albanians and the Serbs was 
remarkably calm and controlled, Turkey again participated in NATO’s Air 
Operation, (Operation Allied Force), with F-16 jet fighters. Aside from providing 
exceptional military support in the form of aircraft, Turkey also accepted a 
significant share, up to 26,000, of Kosovar refugees. Ankara also let the use of 
several of its bases by the United States and NATO during the Kosovo conflict. 
After hostilities ended, Turkey provided troops to Kosovo Force (KFOR).106 
Turkey has been in favor of a lasting negotiated settlement of all Balkan issues 
that could become the source of future instability. In addition to the 
abovementioned operations, Turkish troops engaged in the U.N.-NATO efforts in 
Albania and the Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). These moves have greatly 
contributed to strengthening the Turkish-U.S. relationship and enhancing 
Turkey’s strategic importance in U.S. eyes.107 
From the U.S. point of view, having the military of a predominantly 
Muslim country involved in these peacekeeping operations, indeed not only in 
the Balkans but also in Somalia, was seen as a crucial way of winning the 
confidence of the local Muslim population as well as the Muslim world. As being 
exceptionally a member of both NATO and the Islamic Conference Organization 
(ICO), Turkey, has inevitably been a factor for stability in the often troubled 
Balkans. The crises in the Balkans revealed how closely Turkish, U.S., and 
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European, interests are intertwined. Ankara’s stance in these crises gave Turkey 
the chance do something for Muslims in the Balkans. Moreover, its military's 
existence in such humanitarian and peacekeeping operation has helped to 
relieve some exaggerated fears of Turkey in the Balkans. These kinds of 
operations have been seen as an important area of cooperation between Turkey 
and the United States, although it is not likely that Turkey will consent to 
operate outside its immediate region.108 
Greece, on the other hand, had worries about the expansion of the 
Turkish influence in the Balkans. But the belief that Turkey was creating a 
‘Muslim belt’ was proved to be false in view of Ankara’s close relations with 
Orthodox-majority Bulgaria, Romania, and Macedonia and with Catholic-majority 
Croatia.109 Turkey and Greece has had various longstanding disputes, primarily 
on Cyprus, Aegean, and minority issues and the two countries have come close 
to an armed conflict several times in the past. In early 1996, Turkey and Greece 
came to the brink of war over the islets of Kardak/Imia, and only last-minute 
U.S. diplomatic intervention prevented an armed confrontation. Later, another 
problem arose by Greek Cypriot plans to acquire Soviet made S-300 missile 
system and Turkey’s strong reaction. After repeated Greek Cypriot rescheduling 
of the date of delivery from autumn 1997 to late 1998, Greek Cypriots and 
Greeks agreed to deploy the missiles in Crete. Also, the Öcalan affair 
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deteriorated the atmosphere in early 1999 and pushed bilateral relations near a 
breaking point.110 
The prominent place, that Washington gave Turkish-Greek relations and 
the Cyprus problem in the framework of Turkish-U.S. relations has irritated 
Turkey. The United States has long been involved in supervising Turkish-Greek 
divergences, mostly since the beginning of civil conflict on Cyprus in 1963. With 
the effect of the pro-Greece congressional lobby, Turkish-U.S. relations were 
indexed to progress in Turkish-Greek relations and the Cyprus dispute. The arms 
embargo in 1975 and Johnson’s letter in 1964 were prominent examples. 
Washington’s efforts to urge Turkey on solving its problems with Greece and 
trying to settle the Cyprus issue has not been welcomed  in Ankara, although 
the former applied less pressure than the European capitals. While the 
Europeans had a pro-Greek stance, the U.S. has pursued a nuanced policy on 
Turkish-Greek disputes and even indirectly supported the Turkish position on the 
six-mile territorial-sea limit and on the limit of sovereign airspace.111 
Ending of foreign assistance to Turkey and Greece in the year 1998 has 
had a paradoxically positive impact on Turkish-U.S. relations. Congressional 
pressure of a ratio for aid to Turkey and Greece, and attempts to impose 
Cyprus-related and other political conditions on Turkish aid has come to an 
end.112 The earthquake that struck Turkey on August 17, 1999, became a 
turning point and the atmosphere of Turkish-Greek relations was transformed 
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overnight. Another earthquake struck Athens three weeks later, as if to 
strengthen the point. In the aftermath of the “seismic/earthquake” diplomacy, 
the impact of a new détente between the two countries was seen in Helsinki 
summit in December 1999. Although the new détente improved the climate on 
bilateral issues, it was slower to affect attitudes in the U.S. Congress.113 
Washington has been trying to settle the Cyprus issue because it has 
thought that this would pave the way for improved Turkish-Greek relations and 
further for settling Aegean disputes, but the issue remained insoluble. The U.S. 
concern was that Turkish-Greek tension poses persistent threat to NATO 
cohesion. From Washington’s viewpoint, it was a necessity to solve the Turkish-
Greek disputes. Despite several past confrontations, the two countries had 
maintained the Aegean status-quo for many years without warfare, but the limit 
of an armed conflict between two NATO allies would probably be unknown. To 
avoid confrontations in the Aegean was a shared general interest between 
Washington, Ankara, and Athens. From the Turkish perspective, the existing 
problems were related to Turkey’s vital security interests, sovereignty, and the 
protection of Turkish people, while, from the U.S. perspective, they were 
sources of uneasiness in Turkish-American relations.114 
Turkey has become more important than Greece in the U.S. strategic 
calculations of the post-Cold War world. Turkey’s distinctive connections to both 
Central Asia and the Middle East, its position as a reasonable route for Caspian 
oil and gas to the Western markets, its larger size and greater economic 
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potential, together with the continuing U.S. concern with Iraq, and the Turkish 
factor in the future of Russia were aspects that reinforced this idea. Possibly, it 
has not meant that Washington should therefore choose Turkey’s side or pay 
less attention to Greece, but one thing has always been obvious that the peace 
and stability in the region suits the interests of all sides.115  
 2.3.3. The Middle East 
While most of the Turkish and American policies appeared to overlap in 
other regions, the Middle East became the one on which a mixture of 
cooperative as well as conflicting views came about. Ankara and Washington 
agree that the existing regional balance has to be maintained and stabilized, and 
rise of a regional hegemonic power must be prevented. The spread of weapons 
of mass destruction must be limited and controlled in the region. A successful 
conclusion must be reached in the Middle East peace process. But away from 
these common general views, regional policies of the two countries differ.116  
The Iraqi question and the status of northern Iraq generated the most 
serious source of tension between Turkey and the United States. Firstly, Turks 
have been feeling that the territorial integrity and the national unity of Iraq 
should be preserved. Second, the Turkish economy has long been hurt by the 
U.N. sanctions which brought the official Turkish trade with Iraq to an end.117 
Along with backing the U.S. efforts in the Gulf War, Turkey, closed the 
Kirkuk-Yumurtalik oil pipeline and participated in the U.N. sanctions against Iraq. 
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This made Turkey a key element in the economic isolation of Baghdad, but 
created a massive economic cost to Ankara. Iraq had been one of Turkey’s 
leading export markets prior to the Gulf War. In addition, Ankara gave support 
for Operation Provide Comfort/Operation Northern Watch (OPC/ONW), as 
mentioned before, which was an important binding element in bilateral relations, 
and gave Turkey a vital role in Washington’s Iraq policy. But in the words of 
Obrad Kesic, “…Turkey could go only so far in supporting.”118 
Formally, Ankara and Washington agreed on the main principles of Iraq 
policy by stating that Iraq should comply with the related Security Council 
resolutions and advocated Iraq’s territorial integrity. But both countries differ in 
their objectives and priorities, sometimes in important respects. Turkey’s main 
policy goals in Iraq are; ending, or at least easing, the U.N. sanctions on that 
country, reassertion of full Iraqi sovereignty in the north, prevention of the 
emergence of a de facto Kurdish state or an autonomous Kurdish entity, and 
expulsion of PKK from northern Iraq.119 
Turkey’s economic losses, resulting from the U.N. sanctions on Iraq, was 
stated about $35 billion, in 1997, which demonstrates that no country has 
suffered more from Iraqi sanctions than Turkey. Ankara has an apparent 
economic interest in the resumption of a large-scale trade relationship with Iraq 
that existed before the Gulf War. Turkey welcomed the Security Council 
Resolution 986, which permitted the import of petroleum and petroleum 
products originating in Iraq, as a temporary measure to provide for 
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humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, through the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline. 
But these limited measures were not sufficient in compensating for Turkey’s 
losses. Ankara’s bid for an Article 50 exemption from U.N. sanctions has been 
opposed by Washington, alleging that it would undermine the credibility of the 
sanctions.120   
Ankara, when compared to Washington, clearly favors a stronger Iraqi 
central government; even run by Saddam, to preserve the integrity of the 
country and to prevent a development that could lead to the establishment of a 
Kurdish entity in northern Iraq. Washington, on the other hand, does not oppose 
Kurdish autonomy or a Kurdish component within a federated Iraq. Ankara fears 
that the U.S. efforts to topple Saddam Hussein may further destabilize the 
region and open a way for the creation of a de facto Kurdish state on Turkey’s 
border, and as a result aggravate Turkey’s internal struggle for Kurdish 
separatism.121 In 1992, to minimize the harmful effects of internationalization of 
the Iraqi and Kurdish issues on Turkey’s national security, Ankara developed a 
new approach to the region and began to hold tripartite meetings with Iran and 
Syria. With these meetings, Turkey intended to send a signal to the United 
States about the limits of Turkish-U.S. cooperation in the region, and it was 
stated that a Kurdish Federated state in northern Iraq would threaten the 
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territorial integrity, political unity and sovereignty not only of Iraq, but of Iran, 
Syria and Turkey as well.122 
Although Turkey has been giving an internally controversial support to 
OPC/ONW, it is skeptical about the emergence of a power vacuum in this area 
that enabled PKK to set up bases and camps to launch operations into Turkey. 
Ankara took action in response to the PKK's challenge, toughened its military 
counter-insurgency operations, and has mounted incursions into northern Iraq, 
trying to destroy PKK camps and pursue PKK militants. The powerful Turkish 
Army, together with its increasing proficiency in counter-insurgency operations, 
gradually contained the PKK threat in its military dimension.123 Despite 
conflicting approaches of the two countries to the aforementioned issues, the 
United States, unlike Europeans, has been tolerant of Turkish incursions into 
northern Iraq, has backed Turkey in its counter-terrorism efforts, and accepted 
PKK as a terrorist organization. American intelligence services are widely 
believed to have helped Turkey in the capturing of Abdullah Öcalan in Kenya in 
1999.124  
Turkish-U.S. cooperation in dealing with Iraq has often been 
accompanied by Turkish mistrust of American actions. In September 1998, 
leaders of the two rival Iraqi Kurdish parties, namely Massoud Barzani of 
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Jalal Talabani of Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan (PUK), met with the officials of the State Department in Washington 
and reached a comprehensive agreement which would boost the U.S.’s Iraq 
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policy by fostering Kurdish unity against Saddam Hussein. For its part, Turkey 
was extremely displeased both with being left out of the negotiations and with 
the contents of the agreement exactly before when Turkey had initiated the 
Ankara process with the two. For Turkey, unlike the U.S., Saddam Hussein was 
not the primary threat to stability and peace in the region, but a self-governing 
Kurdish entity was the biggest source of instability.125  
Another source of tension between the two countries has been the 
human rights issue, which was connected to the PKK problem, and will be 
examined elsewhere in this study. This issue has affected U.S. foreign policy 
toward Turkey especially after 1992, which in turn affected the arms relationship 
of the two countries.  
Turkey has a significant place in U.S. strategy toward Iran as an active 
participant in the policy of containment. Besides, Ankara has its own sources of 
friction with neighboring Islamic Republic of Iran, including worries about 
Iranian support for Turkish Islamist fundamentalists and the PKK. Since the 
1979 revolution, Turkish secularists have been concerned about the prospect for 
the export of Iranian radicalism.126 Turkish officials have several times accused 
Iran of interfering in Turkey’s internal affairs, supporting and hosting the PKK, 
and some terrorist attacks on prominent Turkish secularists were thought to 
have an Iranian connection. A brief period of close relations between Iran and 
the leader of the Islamic Welfare Party, Necmettin Erbakan, during the coalition 
government in 1996-97, disturbed the secular military and foreign policy elite. 
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However, Turkey prefers a policy of establishing good political and economic 
relations with Iran.127 
Turkish-U.S. perspectives on Iran also differ considerably. While the 
United States have generally sought to isolate Iran, Turkey favors a policy of 
engagement. Ankara has sought Iran’s cooperation on the Kurdish issue. 
Despite the occasional frictions on the subject, Ankara and Tehran developed a 
more cooperative relationship, from the mid-1990s, to control the activities of 
the PKK on both sides of the border.128 
Energy supply and investment is an increasingly important aspect of 
Turkish-Iranian relations. Iran was one of Turkey’s principal trading partners in 
the 1980s, due to Iran-Iraq war. Turks were certainly discontented about the 
idea that Turkey once more, as in Iraq, was expected to bear the economic 
burden of what they considered as mostly a U.S. foreign policy problem.129 
Ankara was disappointed by the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), passed by the 
U.S. Congress in July 1996, calling for sanctions on foreign companies or states 
that made investments in the Iranian energy industry in excess of $20 million.130 
But, because of its need for new energy resources, the Turkish government 
signed an agreement to purchase $23 billion worth of Iranian natural gas on a 
‘take-or-buy’ basis in August 1996. Turkey has a rapidly growing gas demand, 
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and it is estimated that about 55 billion cubic meters (BCM) of natural gas will 
be needed to import by 2010, while it was about 10 BCM in 1998.131 Because of 
U.S. opposition, Turkey indeed delayed implementation of the agreement, 
announcing that the pipeline, on Turkish side, was not ready. Plus, Ankara 
considered this agreement as importation, not investment, whereas ILSA 
prohibits an ‘investment’ in Iran’s energy sector. The United States opposed 
Turkish gas imports from Iran, and states that it sees Turkey as an alternative to 
the Iranian route, which is more convenient in reality, for Caspian oil and gas. 
This issue was the most important Iran-related source of friction in Turkish-
American relations. To remind, in most cases, the Turkish approach to both Iran 
and Iraq was closer to the European view than to that of the United States.132   
Syria is another country on which Turkey and the United States seem to 
have differing opinions, but this time with the roles changed. Turkish 
policymakers want the U.S. to apply more pressure on Syria, particularly 
regarding its support for the PKK. Even after Turkey compelled Syria, in early 
October 1998, to expel PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan from Damascus and to stop 
its support for the organization officially or risk a Turkish invasion of its territory, 
Ankara is still doubtful about the long-term reliability of Syria’s commitment.133 
But, since then, Turkish-Syrian relations improved noticeably and the United 
States seemed more supportive of Turkey in this crisis.134 
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Turkey has supported the Arab-Israeli peace process, but has had long-
standing concerns over Syria. In addition to providing safe heaven to PKK, 
Damascus, has continued to claim the Turkish province of Hatay (sancak of 
Alexandratta), and has disagreements with Turkey over the share of 
downstream water of Euphrates river. According to a Turkish scholar, Turks 
have had concerns that the end of a Syrian-Israeli conflict might give Damascus 
more confidence about its demands toward Turkey by shifting its troops from 
the Golan Heights cease-fire line to the Turkish border.135 Furthermore, Turkish 
policymakers were likely to believe that the United States was more concerned 
about getting Syria's support for the peace process rather than forcing it to stop 
supporting terrorism. As with the water issue, as said by another scholar, there 
has always been some concern that the United States might pressure Turkey to 
provide Syria with additional amounts of water so that Syria can leave the water 
resources of the Golan Heights to Israel. U.S. failure to consult Turkey through 
the 1995-96 phase of Israeli-Syrian negotiations was received unfavorably in 
Ankara but the sudden end of the peace talks relieved Turkish worries.136  
On the Israeli-Palestinian peace track, Turkish and American views 
coincide. To ensure security, stability and prosperity in the Middle East has been 
for national interests of both Turkey and the United States. Turkey, as a Muslim-
majority state, may contribute to the peace process in a useful way to decrease 
tensions and build confidence among the parties. Progress on the peace process 
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would create a more suitable environment for Turkey to strengthen its relations 
with Jordan, other moderate Arab states, and Israel.137 
Turkey’s intimate and diverse relationship with Israel was particularly a 
positive development from the U.S. perspective. In other words, Turkey raised 
its regional profile and value to the United States by way of this initiative. After 
decades of distant relations affected by declared Turkish sympathy for the 
Palestinians, the signing of the 1993 Oslo Agreement between Israel and the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) created an opportunity for Turkey to 
pursue closer ties with Israel. High-level visits between the two countries has 
resulted in several agreements on various subjects, involving trade, tourism, 
water, agriculture, anti-terrorism, military training, and the exchange of 
intelligence, where the most significant agreements were; the Military Training 
and Cooperation Agreement, Free Trade Agreement, and an Agreement on 
defense industrial cooperation. This relationship has expanded significantly and 
openly receives active U.S. support, including U.S. participation in trilateral 
search and rescue exercises, namely the Reliant Mermaid.138 
Both Turkey and Israel had antagonistic relations with Iran, Iraq and 
Syria, as well as distant relations with most Arab countries. Especially Syria and 
its role in support of PKK was an increasing Turkish concern. Israeli Prime 
Minister, Benyamin Netanyahu condemned Kurdish terrorism, in 1997, and 
supported Turkey in its conflict with PKK. The freezing of Israel’s negotiations 
with Syria was not a cause for disappointment in Turkey, as mentioned before. 
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This relationship provided Ankara with a decisive leverage on Damascus.139 The 
Turkish-Israeli relationship placed useful pressure on Iraq, Iran, and Syria and 
improved Washington’s ability to concentrate on specific issues such as terrorism 
and theatre ballistic missile defense. This relationship developed into a source of 
pressure on Syria’s peace process policies. Moreover, it brought together 
separate elements of U.S. strategy, enhanced the security of two major allies, 
and opened new ways for trilateral or even wider regional cooperation, with the 
participation of other pro-U.S. states, such as Jordan.140 
Ankara faced periodic difficulties in the transfer of arms and military 
technology from the United States and Europe. Whereas Western governments 
remained committed to the support of a strategic ally, the U.S. Congress and 
European parliaments related the issue with Turkey’s human rights performance, 
the PKK, and disputes with Greece. One of the incentives for Ankara’s efforts to 
expand defense ties with Israel has been its desire to avoid the human rights-
related difficulties on defense purchases. Turkey had the support of powerful 
Jewish lobby in Washington as a balancing force against the Greek and 
Armenian lobbies. The Jewish lobby helped Turkey to get American arms that 
had been blocked by the Congress, and has limited the domestic restrictions on 
U.S. support to Turkey. On the other hand, Israel became an alternative source 
of arms supply for Turkey, without any prerequisite, where Israeli weapons are 
compatible with American ones.141 For Washington, Turkish-Israeli cooperation 
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“…served as a potential means for the executive branch to bypass Congress in 
supporting Turkey (through Presidential waivers on Israeli sales of arms that 
include technology originating in the United States)”.142 
This partnership benefited U.S. strategic interests, including preserving 
pro-Western Jordan while containing Iraq, Iran, and Syria. As Larrabee and 
Lesser argued, as a Muslim-majority state, Turkey’s improving relations with 
Israel created an appropriate atmosphere for the normalization of Israel’s 
existence among the Arab states in the Middle East. It was seen, by some Turks, 
as means to strengthen the strategic relationship with the U.S., while it was 
perceived, by Washington, as a progress of a pro-Western alliance in the 
region.143 
The United States had some concerns about this relationship. Initially, 
the addition of a military dimension to the Turkish-Israeli relationship created 
uneasiness in the minds of some American policymakers because of its negative 
effect on Israeli-Syrian peace talks. The U.S. also objected to certain aspects of 
Turkish-Israeli military cooperation particularly in the area of anti-missile 
technology. Moreover, Washington did not want this relationship to damage 
other key regional objectives, namely, Arab-Israeli peace and Turkish-Greek 
stability.144 
Countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and 
ballistic missiles in the Middle East was another shared interest for both Turkey 
and the United States. Three of Turkey’s neighbors, namely, Iraq, Iran and Syria 
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all have WMD programs, and Turkey was vulnerable to these missiles.145 With its 
air force strike capability and its NATO membership, Turkish defense strategy 
was based on deterrence. During the Gulf War, U.S. and NATO anti-missile 
batteries had to be positioned in Turkey against a potential Iraqi missile attack. 
The absence of Turkish anti-missile capability and its vulnerability to its three 
neighbors, led Turkish leaders to counter it by means of Turkish-Israeli military 
cooperation. But, U.S. strategy has concentrated on preventing the spread of 
WMD by exerting pressure on Russia, China and North Korea not to supply these 
countries.146    
 2.3.4. Human Rights Concerns, Lobbies in the U.S., and Other 
Related Issues  
Especially after the mid-1990s the human rights issue has become a live 
subject in Turkish-American relations. After the Gulf War, in the post-Cold War 
era, the issue of human rights abuses came out as a result of confrontations 
between Turkish security forces and the PKK. This attracted public and 
Congressional interest in the United States and affected Washington’s foreign 
policy toward Turkey. Some strains on the Turkish-U.S. relationship were 
caused, occasionally, by Congress’s linking economic and military assistance to 
Turkey to its improvement in human rights record. The Congress also demanded 
the Administration prepare reports on the use of U.S. military equipment in 
situations of human rights violations.147 The powerful lobbying capability of anti-
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Turkish ethnic lobbies, such as the Greek and Armenian lobbies, together with 
human rights and arms control groups considerably reduced the executive 
branch's ability to shield Turkey. Even when there were pro-Turkish lobbies, like 
Jewish and Defense lobbies, Turkey had in this regard a disadvantage of not 
having an effective lobby to influence the Congress in favor of Turkey.148 The 
Democrats, under the leadership of Bill Clinton, had won the elections in the 
U.S. in 1992. This was also an important development that affected the U.S. 
foreign policy toward Turkey because it is known that the Democrats are much 
more influenced by the lobbies, and they give more emphasis to the domestic 
affairs when compared to the Republicans.149 
U.S. arms exports to Turkey have also been affected. In 1996, the United 
States delayed the transfer of ten Super Cobra helicopters and as a result 
Ankara canceled the deal, and the shipment of three frigates to Turkey was also 
delayed for a long term. In 1997, the government permitted the U.S. firms to 
bid on a Turkish project to purchase 145 attack helicopters but did not 
guarantee that a sale would be approved. As a result, Turkey found the U.S. an 
increasingly less reliable source of arms, and as mentioned before, its 
rapprochement with Israel helped Ankara to avoid the human rights-related 
difficulties on defense purchases. The State Department's Human Rights Bureau 
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prepared annual reports criticizing Turkey’s human rights infringements.150 
Additionally, U.S. military aid to Turkey was affected and there were 
considerable cuts in U.S. foreign assistance to Turkey during the mid-1990s and 
the transfer of remaining aid was conditioned on Turkey improving its human 
rights performance. Even if the human rights issue had some negative effects on 
Turkish-American relations, it never ruptured the bilateral relations. 
Washington’s approach to the issue has been limited and less severe than the 
Europeans’. The reason for that was Turkey’s strategic, military and political 
importance in the eyes of the U.S. policymakers.151 
 
2.4. Conclusion 
In the post-Cold War era, the United States largely realized the great 
importance of Turkey and its diverse strategic roles. Turkey is a unique country 
in various respects. It sits at the crossroads of the world and its importance 
comes from its geo-strategic location, its history, its size and strength. Turkey is 
a sole example of secularism, democracy and modernization with its 
predominantly Muslim population and it is a pro-Western state in an area of 
instability. From the U.S. point of view, Turkey has been a model, to some 
extent, for the Turkic Republics of the former Soviet Union, a bridge and line of 
communication between the region and the West, a barrier against possible 
Russian aggression toward the south, a rival against Russia for having an 
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influence over Caucasus and Central Asia, an ideological counterweight against 
fundamentalist Iran, an alternative to Russia and Iran as a possible gateway for 
Caspian energy resources. Moreover, Turkey has participated in peacekeeping 
efforts, as the only Muslim majority NATO ally, in the Balkans, and has been a 
peaceful and influential supporter of besieged Muslims in its area, namely 
Azerbaijan, Chechnya, Bosnia and Kosovo. In addition, Turkey has been a 
supporter of Arab-Israeli peace process, an important contributor to a possible 
normalization of Israeli-Muslim world relations, a key element of Washington’s 
Iraq strategy, and a base for Operation Northern Watch. Shortly, Turkey has 
been a direct contributor to American power projection in adjacent regions. 
But the two countries had different approaches to some matters and had 
conflicting interests on some issues. From Turkey’s point of view, U.S. policy 
toward Moscow was too soft and even Washington had ‘Russia-first’ attitudes. 
The revision of CFE treaty, restrictions created by the U.S. on Turkey’s reaction 
about the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute and its relations with Armenia, and some 
conflicting ideas about the energy corridors in the Caucasus and Central Asia 
were also sources of concerns. Although Ankara and Washington closely 
cooperated in the Balkans, Turkey criticized limited responses of the Western 
powers to the Bosnian conflict in the early phases and its desire for military 
intervention created a short term disagreement with the U.S. On Greece, the 
ending of foreign assistance to Turkey and Greece, the 7:10 ratio issue, and the 
détente, following the earthquakes, between the two countries had positive 
impact on Turkish-U.S. relations. But the prominent place that Washington gave 
the Cyprus problem in the framework of Turkish-U.S. relations has irritated 
Turkey. The Middle East became the region on which the most conflicting views 
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came out. The Iraqi question and the status of northern Iraq generated the 
most serious source of tension between Turkey and the United States. Both 
countries differ in their objectives and priorities, sometimes in important 
respects. Turkey’s main policy goals in Iraq were; ending, or at least easing, the 
U.N. sanctions on that country because of its economic concerns, reassertion of 
full Iraqi sovereignty in the north, prevention of the emergence of a de facto 
Kurdish state or an autonomous Kurdish entity, and expulsion of PKK from 
northern Iraq. Washington, on the other hand, did not oppose Kurdish 
autonomy or a Kurdish component within a federated Iraq and Saddam Hussein 
was the primary threat to stability and peace in the region. Additionally, 
Washington’s relations with leaders of the two rival Iraqi Kurdish parties created 
Turkish mistrust of American actions. About Iran, Turkey did not want to bear 
the economic burden of what it considered as mostly a U.S. foreign policy 
problem. Ankara favored a policy of engagement with Iran while Washington 
generally sought to isolate that country. Turkish policymakers want the U.S. to 
apply more pressure on Syria, particularly regarding its support for the PKK 
while U.S. policymakers were more concerned about getting Syria's support for 
the peace process which might give Damascus more confidence about its 
demands toward Turkey by shifting its troops from the Golan Heights cease-fire 
line to the Turkish border, in case an agreement was reached. U.S. critics about 
Turkey’s human rights records, although not so severe, and anti-Turkish lobbies 
in the Congress, affecting U.S. arms exports to Turkey, also created serious 
concerns in the minds of the Turkish leaders.     
Despite many conflicting interests of Turkey and the United States, the 
two countries were mostly harmonious on various subjects. It was obvious that 
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the United States was a better friend for Turkey than other Western powers. 
Washington showed more willingness than European countries to accept the 
PKK as a terrorist organization. It supported Ankara’s energy politics, to some 
extent, concerning Central Asia. It was less insistent than the E.U. on the Cyprus 
issue, not to disappoint Ankara. It also tried to convince the E.U. to give Turkey 
a candidate status.152 
But, although the two countries were mostly congruent, it has always 
been a possibility that Turkish-American relations would be badly influenced by 
some conflicting views. In the words of George Harris; “…it is not sufficient to 
assume that close ties in the past will assure smooth relations in the future.”153 
The evolution of American defense policy in general and security strategy 
towards the Middle East, Caucasus and Balkans in particular; Turkey’s 
autonomous regional policies which could seriously clash with American 
interests; and Turkey’s economic and political stability would be expected to 
affect the relations between the two countries. The United States, indeed, does 
not want a stronger Turkey capable of enforcing common bilateral interests as a 
regional power. Reasons for this are domestic political considerations, mostly 
relating to Greek and Armenian origin Americans; doubts about Turkey's 
regional image, regarding its imperial past; and a certain suspicion concerning 
whether a strong Turkey, which is able to act as an independent regional force, 
would not behave in ways that enhance U.S. interests. “Some U.S. policymakers 
wonder if a stronger and therefore more independent Turkey would be more or 
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less confrontational with Greece, more or less forthcoming on Cyprus policy, and 
more or less inclined to support U.S. policy toward the Kurds of northern 
Iraq.”154 
No matter what U.S. attitudes on these questions, a stronger, more 
activist and more confident Turkey emerged in the post-Cold war era. And to 
remind, as it was proved in the past, it is difficult to pressure Turkey on issues 
of major national interests.155 
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CHAPTER 3 
TURKISH-ISRAELI RAPPROCHEMENT  
3.1. The History of Turkish-Israeli Relations: 
 The Turkish-Jewish relations date back to 15th century and the relations 
have never been violent in history. The Turks had no traditional enmity towards 
the Jews who has been one of the non-Muslim minorities in Turkey. For 
centuries, the Ottoman Empire was the most important source of refuge and 
prosperity for Jews fleeing from persecution in Europe. In the wake of his 
conquest of Istanbul in 1453, Sultan Mehmet the Conqueror invited many Jewish 
families from Europe to Istanbul. When Sephardic Jews were expelled from 
Spain in 1492, they were welcomed by Sultan Beyazid II. They found protection 
in the Ottoman Empire, and this remains a bright memory. Jews made important 
contributions to the Ottoman administration, economy, science, and culture.156 
In the new Turkish Republic, Atatürk strongly rejected racism or anti-Semitism 
and Turkey has been treating its Jews on an equal footing with other citizens. 
Later, Turkey admitted a large number of Jewish professors escaping from Nazi 
Germany, during World War II, and provided a safe haven for Jews fleeing from 
Nazi Europe.157   
The State of Israel was established on May 14, 1948.158 After the 
Western powers’ recognition, Turkey, as the first Muslim country, recognized 
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Israel on March 28, 1949, and established formal ties with that state. It might 
be surprising that Ankara sided with Arabs at the United Nations and voted 
against the partition resolution, on November 29, 1947, which divided Palestine 
into two states, a Jewish and an Arab state. The reason was that Turkey initially 
thought of Israel as a potential communist Soviet ally. But Western support for 
the new state convinced Ankara that Tel Aviv was pro-Western and in the 1948 
war between Israel and the Arab states, Turkey officially remained neutral.159 
For much of the Cold War period, Turkey designed its foreign policy 
behavior so as to give priority to relations with the West rather than the Middle 
East, and Turkish foreign policy toward the region has always been considered 
as oriented by the West.160 Its Western-oriented foreign policy pattern was one 
of the reasons why Turkey was interested in developing ties with Israel. The 
changes in the global situation with the emergence of the United States as the 
power in the Middle East in place of Britain, convinced Ankara that Israel could 
act as an advocate for Turkey’s interests in Washington. Moreover, in an era in 
which Turkish foreign policy was shaped by security concerns, Israel’s influence 
on the U.S. media to facilitate Turkey’s admittance to NATO also increased 
Ankara’s interest in relations with Israel. From Israel’s viewpoint, it was an 
achievement to have official ties with a Muslim country bordering the Arab 
states. Besides, Turkey’s geographical position and its international connections 
were of great value in the eyes of Israelis.161 
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Turkey’s relations with the Arab World and to a great extent with Israel 
can be defined in four phases: Western-oriented foreign policy (1947-1964), 
Cyprus Question and aftermath (1964-1973), ‘petro-dollar’ oriented policy 
(1974-1989), and the Post-Cold War era.162 From 1945 to 1964, Ankara 
formulated its main policy objectives according to the Soviet threat.163 Turkey 
tried to show its eagerness to be closer to the West but as a result of Turkey’s 
recognition of Israel, Turkish-Arab relations appeared to get worse.164 To lessen 
the strong reactions from Arab nations, Ankara abstained from voting on Israel’s 
membership to the United Nations, on May 11, 1949, but Arab reactions did not 
change and they blamed Turkey for acting with the West. The formation of the 
Baghdad Pact, in 1955, with the only Arab member Iraq, did not ease Arab 
criticism of Turkey.165 Turkish-Israeli relations showed significant progress but 
Turkey recalled its ambassador, on November 26, 1956, from Tel Aviv because 
of the Suez crisis.166 However, Turkey made clear that this political act was 
taken to save the Baghdad Pact, and was not a hostile attempt against the State 
of Israel. Then, a series of events declined Turkey’s credibility in the eyes of the 
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Arab states which were; Ankara’s support of the Eisenhower Doctrine,167 and its 
decision to let the U.S. to use the NATO base during the 1958 Lebanon crisis.168 
Turkish-Israeli relations may have seemed distant from the outside, but in 
reality, cooperation has been continuous. After the overthrow of the regime in 
Iraq, in July 1958, Turkey and Israel agreed on a secret pact, known as the 
‘Peripheral Pact’, which was concluded during an unannounced visit of Israeli 
Prime Minister David Ben Gurion, to Ankara, on August 29-30, 1958. The pact 
was for cooperation in the diplomatic, military, and intelligence areas along with 
in commercial and scientific fields with the aim of embracing Turkey, Israel, Iran 
and Ethiopia. But this pact did not have a long-lasting effect.169        
Following the 1960 military coup, Turkish leaders began to question their 
Western-dominated foreign policy. Turkey’s relations with the West were 
deteriorated, to some extent, after the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, in which 
Washington decided to remove nuclear-capable Jupiter missiles based in Turkey 
in return for the U.S.S.R. withdrawal of Soviet missiles in Cuba and U.S. 
president Lyndon Johnson’s famous letter of 1964, warning Ankara to stop 
preparations for an intervention and threatening Turkey not to trust NATO 
protection if Soviets were involved in the conflict. These events led to a search 
for foreign policy modifications less dependent on the U.S. and NATO for 
Turkey. As a consequence, Ankara decided to adopt a multidimensional foreign 
policy; abandoned its traditional policy of cool relations with the Soviet Union, 
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revised its security policy (relating to the Cyprus problem), tried to strengthen 
its ties with the Arab states and emerging Third World, and carried out a more 
balanced attitude toward the Arab-Israeli dispute. This new foreign policy did 
not aim to shift Turkey’s relations with the West, but rather to broaden 
friendship and provide more alternative sources of security and welfare support. 
This inevitably led to the steady reduction of ties with Israel. During the 1967 
Arab-Israeli War (the Six Day War), Turkey did not allow the U.S. to use military 
bases to provide logistical support to Israel and opposed the Israeli occupation 
of Arab territories. In 1973, Turkey distanced itself from Israel in relation to the 
oil crisis and refused to allow the Americans to use Turkish bases during the 
October war of 1973 (Yom Kippur).170 
Turkey, especially after the end of the Six Day War, generally supported 
the Arab resolutions at the U.N. General Assembly, including the 1975 resolution 
labeling Zionism as a form of racism. In October 1979, the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) was given permission, by Turkey, to open an office in 
Ankara. From 1964 to 1979, Turkey maintained its neutral policy despite the 
rapprochement with the Arab states. It should be kept in mind that this 
rapprochement was a consequence of Turkey’s worsening economic conditions 
and its need for support in the Cyprus conflict.171 
Three important developments happened in the beginning of the 1980s; 
Islamic revolution in Iran, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the Iran-Iraq war. 
In March 1980, Turkey signed a defense and economic cooperation agreement 
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with the United States.172 On July 30 of the same year, Knesset enacted a law 
declaring Jerusalem as the immutable capital of the state of Israel. Ankara 
condemned the decision and responded with the closure of its Jerusalem 
consulate on August 28, 1980. Later, on December 2, 1980, Turkey formally 
downgraded its relations with Israel to the second secretary level. The seeming 
reason for Ankara’s move was budgetary crisis. In order to reduce the foreign 
trade deficit in a period of second oil shock at the time of Khomeini, Turkey had 
to seek assistance from Arab countries to get necessary oil for the approaching 
winter and to expand economic ties with these countries.173 Although Turkish-
Arab relations flourished and its bilateral trade with the regional countries 
increased, Turkey’s relations with Israel were never severed. Turkey continued 
its neutral attitude during the 1982 Lebanon Crisis, letting the use of its bases to 
Americans for humanitarian purposes only. Despite Ankara’s recognition of 
Palestine as an independent state after its declaration of independence on 
November 14, 1988, Turkish leaders had scrutinized their policies through the 
1980s. Turkey’s hope for Arab support on the Cyprus issue proved false when 
most of the Arabs sided with Greece. Furthermore, during Bulgaria’s brutal 
campaign of forced assimilation of its Turkish minority, Ankara could not find 
Arab support. On the other hand, Turkey’s relations with its Middle Eastern 
neighbors Iraq and Syria, as well as Iran, were deteriorating due to the control 
over water resources and Turkey’s Southern Anatolian Project (GAP). 
Additionally, Syria’s support of violent anti-Turkish groups, such as the Armenian 
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Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and the Kurdish insurgency 
group (PKK), ongoing contentious issue of Hatay (sancak of Alexandretta), and 
Iran’s efforts to undermine the secular nature of Turkey were the factors that 
contributed to worsening of relations. By the late 1980s, Turkish-Israeli relations 
were glowing again. In September 1986, Turkey made an attempt to upgrade 
relations with Israel by sending a senior diplomat to Tel Aviv as chargé d’affaires 
and Israel responded in the same way. During the Intifada (1987-1993), Turkey 
plainly condemned the cruel actions by the Israeli military but did noting else 
diplomatically.174 
Although there were some alterations in behavior, one of the major 
points of Turkish foreign policy, during much of the Cold War era, was to keep 
itself from getting involved in the turbulent affairs of the Middle East. Ankara 
sustained a steady and cautious foreign policy toward the region. Turkish-Israeli 
relations, in particular, were strongly affected by Turkey’s relations with Arabs, 
and its partiality to look to the West rather than the Middle East for allies. But 
the changes in the international system, as a result of the end of the Cold War, 
encouraged Turkey to establish a greater presence in the region than that it had 
before.175 
 
3.2. Developments in the Post Cold War Era 
 With the beginning of the 1990s, significant developments and changes 
in the international structure began to take place. The end of the Cold War and 
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the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Gulf War, and the Arab-Israeli peace 
process were important events of the early 1990s which effected and shaped 
the future of Turkey’s relations with the Middle East in general and with Israel in 
particular. These developments caused fundamental changes in the foreign 
policy orientations of most of the states, including Turkey. 
  
3.2.1. Important Changes in the 1990s 
Undoubtedly, one of the most important developments in the world was 
the collapse of the Cold War system of international relations. Turkey, as most 
other countries, redefined its geo-strategic position and adopted itself to the 
new circumstances of the new environment. As a result of the disappearance of 
the Soviet Union, and the establishment of new states like Ukraine, Georgia and 
Armenia, the threat from the north for Turkey weakened.176 But, despite the 
removal of the Soviet threat, Turkey, contrary to most Western countries, 
emerged from the Cold War with a sense of high threat perception, especially 
regarding the Middle East. Ankara considered itself surrounded by many areas of 
instability and threatened by dangerous neighbors. Accordingly, Turkey started 
to consider itself to be a more important actor in global politics, and began to 
pursue a more activist foreign policy course which was most strongly seen in the 
Middle East region, as a result of changes in its geo-strategic situation, as 
mentioned earlier in this study.177 
                                                 
176 Ester Ruben, Türkiye İsrail Yakınlaşması: Nedenler, Parametreler ve Gelecek için Perspektifler, 
(Turkey Israel Rapprochement: Reasons, Parameters, and Future Perspectives), (İstanbul: 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 1999), p.19. 
177 Efraim Inbar, “Turkey’s New Strategic Partner: Israel”, in Michael Radu (ed.), Dangerous 
Neighborhood: Contemporary Issues in Turkey’s Foreign Relations, (New Brunswick and London: 
 84 
The Gulf War was another important event whose influence was intense 
in the Middle East. In an environment where Turkish political elite had serious 
concerns about their country’s strategic importance for the West after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the Gulf Crisis provided an opportunity for Turkey 
to overcome its concerns. After years of pursuing a non-intervention policy in 
the Middle East, Turkey became one of the key players and one of the first 
countries to ally with the U.S. against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Though 
Turkey did not receive the expected benefits from the Gulf War, its direct 
involvement gave Turkey a chance to secure its strategic position in the new 
international environment, and to reassert its role and importance in the new 
era.178 The Gulf War also divided the Arab countries between USA and Iraq 
which can be understood as the breaking of the pan-Arab solidarity. As a result 
Turkey found the opportunity to shape its Middle East policy freely.179 
Another important change in the 1990s, related to the Middle East, was 
the peace process that started between Israel and the Palestinians. The peace 
process that began in October 1991 in Madrid, opened up a new foreign policy 
opportunity for Turkey. This process freed Turkey from the difficulty of 
balancing between Arab countries and Israel. The peace process also “removed 
the last barrier to the betterment of the relations [between Turkey and 
Israel].”180 Additionally, seeing that the Arab states were normalizing relations 
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with Israel, the process made such relations publicly acceptable.181 The Oslo 
Agreement in September 1993 (Israel-PLO recognition and peace) and Israeli-
Jordanian Peace in October 1994 were significant agreements on the peace 
process in the region.182  
 
3.2.2. Improving Relations between Turkey and Israel: 
In the light of the developments mentioned above, Turkey and Israel 
have improved their relations especially after 1993. But even before, the 
rapprochement between the two countries had begun by Turkey’s decision to 
raise the level of the representation of both Israel and PLO to embassy status on 
19 December 1991. Along with the 1991 Madrid Peace Process, the Soviet 
Union’s and the Eastern Europeans’ decisions to restore full relations with Israel, 
and even China’s plans to establish relations with that state, facilitated Turkey’s 
move.183  
In the first half of the 1990s, high-level Turkish and Israeli visits took 
place. On July 1, 1992, the Turkish Minister of Tourism went to Israel and 
concluded a tourism cooperation agreement, which was one of the first 
agreements between the two countries.184 Later, on November 14, 1993, 
Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin, as the first Turkish Foreign Minister visiting Israel, 
went to that country and signed a series of agreements on economic 
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cooperation and cultural exchange. It was the beginning of the blossoming 
relationship for the restructuring the Middle East.185 Top level visits intensified in 
1994. In January, Israeli President Ezer Weizman, and in April, then-Israeli 
Foreign Minister Shimon Peres visited Turkey.186 Turkish Prime Minister Tansu 
Çiller, in 1994, and Turkish President Süleyman Demirel, in 1996, reciprocated 
these visits. Çiller’s visit to Israel was the first-ever by a Turkish Prime Minister. 
This was politically important because for the first time Turkey showed its tilt 
toward Israel and the trip was the symbol of changing character of the relations 
between the two countries.187 
Until early 1996, Ankara seemed to favor economic, technical, and 
cultural ties with Israel rather than military cooperation.188 But, during the 
February 1996 visit of the deputy of the Turkish Chief of Staff, Gen. Çevik Bir, 
the two countries signed a Military Training and Cooperation Agreement. Then 
some others including Free Trade Agreement in March 1996, and an agreement 
concerning the defense industry, in August 1996, were signed between Turkey 
and Israel.189 The 1996 accords were followed by an outbreak of mutual visits 
and declarations as to the great importance each country attached to the 
relationship. The Turkish army’s Chief of Staff İsmail Hakkı Karadayı’s visit, in 
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February 1997, was followed by several senior military and civilian staff.190 
Turkish Defense Minister, Turan Tayan, in May 1997, Prime Minister Mesut 
Yılmaz, and shortly after Foreign Minister İsmail Cem, in July 1998, and 
President Süleyman Demirel, in July 1999 visited Israel.191        
Besides, both countries had changed some of their policies regarding 
each other. Jerusalem had long refused to take sides against Kurdish terrorism, 
despite Turkish requests. This policy was caused by the fear of opening a new 
terrorist front in relation to the PKK; also a constant pro-Kurdish sentiment 
exists in Israel, lingering from the countries support for the Kurdish struggle in 
northern Iraq in the 1960s and 1970s. But Prime Minister Netanyahu changed 
this traditional behavior, in May 1997, and clearly supported Turkey in its conflict 
with the PKK by both condemning Kurdish terrorism, and warning Syria that 
there would be no peace unless it stopped its support for PKK terrorism. In 
addition, while some of Israeli academics had a pro-Armenian position on the 
Turkish-Armenian issue, officials and army officers firmly rejected charges of 
genocide against Armenians. Israelis also became aware of Turkey’s discomfort 
about the Israeli-Syrian peace negotiations and the sudden end of the peace 
talks did not create disappointment in Turkey. And, Israelis gave up their long-
time policy of neutrality in Greco-Turkish relations and rejected to expand 
military ties with Greece.192  
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Turkey, on the other hand, changed some of its traditional foreign policy 
behaviors. Ankara had long refrained from promoting relations with Israel and 
even refused to acknowledge its ties with that country for fear of harming its 
ties with the Arab and Communist worlds. Although Turkey remained sensitive 
primarily about two topics, the Palestinian and Armenian issues, Ankara opened 
the way for better relations with Israel.193  
 
3.3. Core of the Relations 
3.3.2. Civilian Domains:  
Turkey and Israel are the only two democratic countries in the region and 
share western moral values. There has been a widespread civilian interaction 
between the two countries. Bilateral relations have developed remarkably in the 
domains of culture, education and science; environment and nature protection; 
mail and telecommunications; efforts to stop the smuggling of drugs and 
narcotic substances; health and agriculture; regulation of trade free of custom 
duties; encouragement of protection of financial investments; avoidance of dual 
taxation; and technical and economic cooperation. 194 
The Turkish-Israeli Free Trade Area Agreement was signed in March 
1996, and became effective on May 1, 1997 after being ratified by both 
parliaments. This agreement opened new possibilities for economic relations 
between the two countries, not only in the commercial sphere but also in 
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investments, industrial and agricultural cooperation. The agreement was seen, 
in Turkey, as important, not only because it provided access to the Israeli 
market, but was also a stepping-stone to other markets, namely those in the 
U.S., Jordan and Palestinian areas. Turks sell textiles and other commodities 
duty-free to Israel, which adds its labor to the product and re-exports then to 
the US duty-free. Another agreement on the prevention of double taxation was 
signed in March 1996, and entered into force on May 1998. Finally, an 
agreement for mutual encouragement of protection of financial investments was 
signed in March 1996, and entered into force in August 1998.195 Trade between 
the two countries increased with much of the increase in Turkey’s favour. (See 
Table-I)196 Turkey finds a new area for its exports of textiles, industrial products, 
food products electronics, raw materials and grains. Also both countries have 
looked for implementing joint Turkish-Israeli projects in the countries of Central 
Asia. Israeli companies have proposed, to their Turkish counterparts, job 
opportunities in Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan.197 Joint Economic 
Commission (JEC) meetings have been held at the ministerial level between two 
countries.198  
Table-I: Israel’s Civilian Trade with Turkey (million $) 
 1990 1993 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Export 88.7 121.8 197.2 256.7 287.2 334.2 430.5 
Import 36.2 80.3 252.1 355.4 443.1 556.8 586.6 
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Tourism has become one of the most prominent components of the 
bilateral economic relations, as well as indication of the friendly atmosphere 
prevailing between Turkey and Israel. With some 2 million Israelis touring the 
world each year, the number of Israelis visiting Turkey has increased 
progressively, especially following a cooperation agreement on tourism signed in 
June 1992. For instance, an estimated 400,000 Israeli tourists visited Turkey in 
1997, spending about $400 million.199 However, a slight drop in the number of 
Israeli tourists to Turkey was experienced due to the closing of casinos in 
Turkey in early 1998, while the number of Turkish tourists to Israel has been 
growing.200 
Turkey has become an important source of water for Israel, and showed 
an interest in selling fresh water to that state since the 1990s. This became, 
once more, a main topic of discussion in the July 1999 visit of President 
Süleyman Demirel to Israel. Ankara offered to supply Israel with 180 million 
cubic meters of its Manavgat water a year, in huge plastic balloons hauled by 
tugboats. In the past, Israel had repeatedly refused Turkish proposals. Both 
countries decided to establish a joint committee of technicians to discuss the 
feasibility of the project.201 Reasons for Israel’s repeated refusals were ongoing 
arguments in Israel that the overall cost of importing water would be higher 
than desalination of seawater or producing water from other sources.202 After 
settling the details of the project, Turkey and Israel finally sealed an agreement 
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in April 2001 to start the transportation of 50 million cubic meters of water per 
year from Manavgat River to the Israeli port of Ashkelon via super-tankers which 
has never happened in the world before.203  
The Israeli government seemed especially interested in initiating Turkish-
Israeli joint projects in agriculture and other sectors in the newly independent 
Transcaucasian and Central Asian Republics where a Turkish ‘entrance card’ may 
assist Israel’s desire to expand its ties to that region.204 Israel’s advanced 
agriculture technology, such as its improved irrigation systems, has also created 
possibilities for cooperation in Turkey itself, especially in the southeast. Israeli 
firms have shown a significant interest in getting involved in the Southeastern 
Anatolian Project (GAP).205 Israel was one of the first countries to respond to 
Turkey’s earthquake in August 1999 by sending a rescue team, establishing a 
large field hospital, and collecting and sending goods to Turkey. Moreover, 
Israeli firms were interested in the construction projects in the region after the 
earthquake.206 
Finally, Israel and its friends lobbied on behalf of Turkey, the Israel lobby 
helped with the U.S. Congress, reducing criticism of Turkey over various human 
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rights issues, and helping Turkey’s campaign against the stationing of Russian-
made S-300 missiles on Cyprus, as will be examined elsewhere in this study.207  
 
3.3.1. Military Domains 
 Israeli-Turkish military cooperation formally dates to the signing of two 
defense cooperation agreements in February and August 1996. First was the 
Military Training and Cooperation Agreement (MTCA), signed on February 23, 
1996, between Turkish deputy chief of staff, General Çevik Bir, and Israeli 
defense ministry director-general, David Ivry.208 The second key agreement, the 
framework agreement concerning defense industrial cooperation, was signed on 
August 26, 1996.209 Although the contents of the agreements remained secret, 
they were believed to include protocols regarding joint air and naval training, 
sharing of training information, officer exchanges, visits by military delegations, 
observation of one another’s training exercises, naval port visits, cooperation in 
the areas of counter-terrorism and border security, and defense industrial 
cooperation.210 
 Training and Exercises: Since 1996, each country’s pilots have exercised 
in the other’s airspace for one week eight times a year, with four deployments in 
each country. Turkish F-16 pilots have trained at the Nevatim airfield and at 
Israel’s computerized firing range, learned about electronic war, benefited from 
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Israel’s systems of training in advanced technology warfare.211 Even, when some 
press reports claimed that Turkish pilots had been trained for an air-strike 
against Greek-Cypriot airbase where the Russian S-300 missiles were supposed 
to be deployed, Turkish defense sources stated, concerning the maneuvers, that 
the Turkish jets had not been trained in Israel to destroy Russian-made 
antiaircraft missiles, but on how to evade them.212 These exercises enable Israeli 
pilots to have access to the vast land mass of Anatolia to practice long-range 
flying over mountainous areas, which is very different from flying over water. 
This also facilitates Israelis’ potential preparation for possible missions against 
Iran. Overland exercises were unique for Israeli pilots, where they could 
generally train over the Mediterranean Sea as a consequence of the very small 
size of their country.213  
The two sides held joint naval and air maneuvers in the Mediterranean 
Sea in June 1997, with the apparent purpose of coordinating search-and-rescue 
procedures. These took place in the international waters, in the eastern 
Mediterranean, close to the Syrian coast.214 Moreover, the two countries 
announced plans for trilateral Turkey-Israel-U.S., five-day naval search-and-
rescue exercise later the same year, called ‘Reliant Mermaid’. It was originally 
scheduled to take place in mid-November 1997, but after being twice 
postponed, and six months later than planned, Turkey, Israel, and the U.S. held 
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Operation Reliant Mermaid in January 1998.215 Two frigates (TCG Yavuz and 
TCG Zafer) and a helicopter from Turkey, a destroyer (USS John Rogers) and a 
helicopter from the U.S. and two missile boats (INS La Hav and INS Nitzahon) 
and air elements from Israel conducted the exercise, along with observers from 
Jordan.216 This trilateral exercise has been held every year, with the participation 
of a Jordanian military observer, and has become the symbol of U.S. support for 
Turkish-Israeli cooperation.217   
Defense Industrial Cooperation: Turkey and Israel signed a number of 
contracts that could make Israel the major arms and technology supplier of 
Turkey. This allowed Ankara to avoid sanctions by its traditional arms suppliers 
in Western Europe and the United States, because of the efforts of anti-Turkish 
lobbies and claimed human rights violations during the course of Turkey's 
struggle with the PKK. The defense industrial cooperation between the two 
countries can be categorized as weaponry upgrade, hardware purchase and 
joint production. Israeli aircraft industries have been modernizing fifty-four of 
Turkey’s F-4E fighter jets, upgrading them with improved firepower and better 
vision and electronics, and equipping them with Popeye-I air-to-ground missiles. 
The project was started in Israel and will be finished in Turkey. Later, a second 
upgrade contract was awarded to Israel for Turkey’s forty-eight F-5 aircraft. 
Israelis also sought to upgrade Turkey’s aging U.S.-made M-60 tanks.218 The 
deal continued with the purchase of 200 Popeye-I standoff missiles; some come 
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along with the transformed F-4 Phantom 2000s. In addition, Turkey has been 
interested in Israel’s Falcon early-warning aircraft systems, unmanned air 
vehicles, a radar system for detecting plastic and conventional mines, and 
special fence systems to block the Turkish borders with Syria and Iraq to 
prevent PKK infiltration, and Galil infantry rifle to replace the Turkish G-3 
infantry rifles. Moreover, Israel’s Merkava Mark-III main battle tank was among 
the bidders of Turkey’s project of co-producing modern battle tanks to replace 
the aging ones. While Turkey was planning to expand and modernize its fleet of 
attack and transport helicopters and its navy, Israeli firms are positioned to get 
additional major contracts. Israeli-Russian Ka-52 helicopter was one of the 
bidders in Turkey’s co-production of attack helicopters project, which is not fully 
concluded yet. Turkey and Israel also agreed to co-produce Popeye-II air-to-
ground missiles which has the range of 150kms and can be used in F-16s, and 
talked about a project to produce Arrow and long-range Delilah missiles.219  
Intelligence and Security: Intelligence cooperation has been another 
major area of Turkish-Israeli relations, including exchange of information, 
routine briefings, and analysis of data collected by Israeli satellites. Both 
countries have shared information relating to terrorism and the military 
capabilities of Syria, Iraq and Iran. Turkey’s location next to these three 
countries, plus Israel’s border with Syria, pointed to their mutual value.220 
Although the officials have denied it, a newspaper claimed that Israel has shared 
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secret information with Turkey about MIG-29 warplanes, the type used by 
Syria’s air force. It is also widely believed that the Israelis take advantage of 
flying in Anatolia, close to Syria, Iraq, and Iran, to gather information about 
those hostile states.221 
 
3.4. Motives, Common Interests, and Implications  
3.4.1. Why A Chance?  
Israelis, since David Ben-Gurion's time, have always looked for better 
relations with Turkey which would help breaking the hostile ring of Arab 
neighbors, dilute the religious element of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and provide 
Israel with an important strategic ally and trading partner. But why did Turks, 
after long years of showing little interest, seek such a tight bond with Israel, 
rather than the Muslim world? And why did such an impressive relationship 
develop between the two countries? Here the reply, to some extent, lies in the 
nature of Turkish-Arab relations. Turks have had no problems with Israel and 
the Jewish nation throughout history, and both countries have shared, what 
Alan Makovsky called, “a common sense of otherness” in a region dominated by 
non-democratic Arab regimes.222 But, in contrast, Turks have long had poor 
relations with Arabs, distinguished by discord and friction. While Ankara strongly 
associated with the West, and saw communism and the Soviet Union as a 
threat, the Arabs regarded the West as the most serious threat to their 
independence and prosperity. Furthermore, they have often blamed the 
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Ottoman Empire, which controlled much of the Middle East through four 
centuries, for their current plight.223 
 
3.4.2. Motives behind the Rapprochement:  
Turkey’s resentment with Arabs on Cyprus and Bulgaria issues, together 
with the developments in the Post Cold War era, namely the disappearance of 
the Soviet Union, the Gulf War, and the Israel-PLO agreement, as mentioned 
earlier, were among the factors that shaped Turkey’s Israel initiative. In 
addition, Turkey’s increased concerns about NATO’s security guarantees against 
the threats emanating from the Middle East, Ankara’s search for a reliable ally in 
the region in a new environment, and noticeable sense of self confidence that 
prevailed among the Turkish elites were other reasons influencing Turkey’s 
course. Ankara has had lack of confidence on the full support of NATO in the 
protection of Turkey’s interests in the Middle East. Even Şükrü Elekdağ, former 
Turkish ambassador to Washington, D.C., argued that “With the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union, NATO has totally lost its function of providing support for 
Turkey's defense”.224 NATO was never united on including the ‘out of area’ 
intervention in its contingency plans and Ankara could never be certain if NATO 
would invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty in case Turkey was attacked by 
any of its Middle Eastern neighbors. So, Turkey tried to find regional solutions to 
its Middle Eastern problems and in Mustafa Kibaroğlu’s words “As the Middle 
East lurches into the twenty-first century, spinning out new threats in all 
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directions, there is no room for doubt: a de facto military alliance with Israel is 
in the Turkish national interest”.225 
 
3.4.3. Common Interests 
Turkey and Israel share a number of common strategic interests, making 
them natural allies. Both are non-Arab, largely secular, and also democratic 
states. They are Western-oriented, have important allied relationships with the 
United States, with military inventories based mainly on U.S. equipment. They 
are also moderate and status quo oriented in their foreign policies. Both want to 
be close to Europe but are often held at arm’s-length by the Europeans. Both 
are deeply concerned about terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism. They are 
both medium-sized powers with significant defense needs and they see 
themselves primarily as nation-states.226 
As for their mutual interests, both countries wish for a stable region and 
are concerned about radical forces which might destabilize the region. While 
their priorities are different, Turkey and Israel are close enough in their 
concerns to have a largely general set of interests, one of the most important of 
which is an attempt to deter radical forces. Both countries had antagonistic 
relations with Syria, Iraq, and Iran, as well as distant relations with most Arab 
countries. Syria is considered by the Turks to be the most efficient neighboring 
state that caused serious troubles in Turkey. Syrian government has steadily 
claimed an entire Turkish province of Hatay (formerly known as Alexandretta), 
as its own. Official Syrian maps have showed the area as part of Syria. 
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Moreover, Damascus has alleged rights to large flows of Euphrates (Dicle) River 
waters, protested the Turkish hydroelectric plants and dams, and has seen the 
massive GAP project as a threat to itself. Syria has also supported PKK, hosted 
for years its headquarters along with its leader Abdullah Öcalan, and allowed the 
organization to train in Lebanon, despite repeated promises to stop aiding it. At 
the same time, Syria has been the neighbor most likely to attack Israel, has 
threatened Israel’s territorial integrity, and has supported terrorist groups of 
Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Palestinian rejectionist groups, and Hizbullah opposed to 
Israel.227 
 To remind, economic growth, due to the major reforms which were 
undertaken in 1980, and the growing prosperity have differentiated Turkey from 
many of its neighbors and created a sense of self-confidence. In addition, by 
increasing its defense expenditures, Ankara upgraded its military equipment to 
have a more efficient military and the increase in military capacity gave Turkey 
the ability for power projection into adjacent regions. In contrast, its neighbors 
have experienced severe weaknesses in military strength in the 1990s. Syria has 
not been receiving advanced weaponry free of charge from Moscow, and has 
not been able to modernize its equipment. Similarly, Iraq's military was badly 
damaged in the Gulf War, and sanctions imposed on the country reduced its 
ability to get new equipment. And Iran has been isolated internationally after 
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the Islamic revolution and had a troubled economy after the eight-year war with 
Iraq.228  
So, Damascus, Baghdad, and Tehran do not constitute very serious 
threats to Turkey militarily. Turkey and Israel supported the anti-Iraq coalition 
during the Gulf war. For Turkey, disputes with Iraq have included the question 
of northern Iraq, the protection of the Turkoman minority in Iraq, and the 
politics of water. Iraq, during the Gulf War, opened a second front by sending its 
Scud missiles into Israeli territory. The main source of tension between Turkey 
and Iran has regarded Tehran’s relentless support for Islamic fundamentalist 
movements in Turkey. Israel was more concerned about Iran as a threat in 
strategic, political and terrorist terms. If there is a potential military risk to 
Turkish security in the region, it is the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) and tactical ballistic missiles (TBMs). Turkey has no known 
WMD capability, while Syria, Iraq and Iran all have WMD programs. And Iran is 
widely believed to be pursuing a nuclear weapons program and Turkey and 
Israel have had a permanent interest in preventing other Middle Eastern nations 
from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.229  
Related to the topics mentioned above, the maintenance of a politically 
and militarily fragmented Middle East has been a primary strategic interest for 
Israel and Turkey and both states have sought to prevent the rise of a regional 
hegemon. Indeed, as a result of the Gulf war, pan-Arab solidarity had been 
totally set aside, and this eased the two countries’ courses. Additionally, Turkey 
and Israel shared a common interest in curbing the influence of radical Islam. 
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While secular Turkey has seen Islamist Iran as a rival, Israel has had a similar 
interest in restraining the weight of radical Islam, because Muslim extremists 
oppose the very existence of the Jewish State.230 Both countries have also aimed 
to combat terrorism that emanate from local and Iranian or Syrian-sponsored 
groups, such as the PKK, Hizbullah, Islamic Jihad, and Hamas and they want to 
prevent Syria from protecting these groups. Combating terrorism jointly has 
been a powerful justification for extensive Turkish-Israeli military cooperation 
and is often cited by Turkey when confronted by Arab opposition to its 
cooperation with Israel.231  
 
3.4.4. Regional Implications and Gains:  
The entente between the two capitals has not been clearly a military 
alliance in the traditional sense. Officials from both sides declared that it was not 
an alliance, and neither promised to go to the other's defense. However, the 
relationship between Turkey and Israel can be called a strategic partnership 
since it reflects a convergence of views on a wide range of global and regional 
issues. The Turkish-Israeli entente strengthened each state separately, and 
enhanced their regional status. Moreover, their combined power and its 
potential use influenced the strategic calculus in various capitals of the region. 
The entente provided both states with deterrence capability, and states which 
considered the use of force against Turkey and Israel had to bear in mind their 
combined power. Most of the regional capitals, especially Damascus, Cairo, 
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Baghdad, and Tehran, condemned this military cooperation and accepted it as 
directed against the Arab nations. The relationship also prompted especially 
Syria to seek counter-balancing alliances with other Middle Eastern states, such 
as Iran.232 
Regarding Turkey’s gains, as a consequence of its relations with Israel, 
Ankara acted determinedly on taking military action in protecting its vital 
interests. A striking example was Turkey’s decision to send a strong and decisive 
signal to Syria in 1998. Ankara showed its determination to follow its own policy 
on the Kurdish problem and threatened Syria to use military force if the PKK 
leader, Abdullah Öcalan, were not extradited from his longtime refuge in 
Damascus. The Turkish military buildup along the border in early October 1998 
convinced Syria about Ankara’s seriousness. Having positioned most of its troops 
near the Israeli border, Syria would not have been able to resist a Turkish 
invasion. With the fear of engaging in a two-front war between Turkey and 
Israel, Damascus accepted the Turkish proposal. Another example was Turkey’s 
strong reaction against Greek Cypriot plans to acquire Soviet made S-300 missile 
system, and to deploy them in Cyprus. In both cases, Turkey’s demands had 
been met by means of Turkey’s deterrence policy which has been strengthened 
by its close relations with Israel.233  
It has been widely believed, by many Turks, that friendship with Israel 
means support from America. This belief derived partly from the fact that Israel 
has had intimate relationship with the United States, and partly from the might 
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of the Jewish lobby in Washington. Turkey has been pleased to have the 
support of the powerful Jewish lobby in the United States, especially on the so 
called Armenian ‘genocide’ issue and on maintaining the flow of US arms, and 
have seen the lobby as a balancing force against the Greek and the Armenian 
lobbies.234 In addition to the increased U.S. support for Turkey, and Jewish 
lobbying on Turkey’s behalf, Israeli diplomats spent much time in support of 
Turkey’s bid to join the European Customs Union.235    
Ankara faced periodic difficulties in the transfer of arms and military 
technology from the United States and Europe. Whereas Western governments 
remained committed to the support of a strategic ally, the U.S. Congress and 
European parliaments related the issue to Turkey’s human rights performance, 
the PKK, and disputes with Greece. One of the incentives for Ankara’s efforts to 
expand defense ties with Israel has been its desire to avoid human rights-
related difficulties on defense purchases, and its need for a reliable source of 
high-technology military equipment. Because both states’ military inventories 
were based on U.S. equipment, Israel could play the role of an alternative, 
sometimes cheaper, source of military arms, technology and hardware without 
any prerequisites.236 
 The supply of field-tested counter-terrorism products from Israel, a 
regular seller of such equipment, and the sharing of intelligence with 
experienced Israeli counter-terrorism officers were perceived to be in Turkey's 
national interest. Plus, it was widely assumed that Israel helped the Turkish 
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government in locating PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan when Turks captured him in 
early 1999.237 
Moreover, the economic cooperation between Turkey and Israel affected 
Turkish economy in a positive way. The cooperation compensated, at least 
partly, the losses of the Turkish economy that it faced in its trade with the 
Middle East and North Africa after the Gulf war.238  
Concerning Israel’s gains, as a result of its rapprochement with Turkey, 
Israel found a priceless ally in the Middle East. The combination of Turkey's 
military power, its strategic location bordering Iran, Iraq and Syria and its close 
ideological affinity with Israel, make Turkey an invaluable ally in the region. 
Israel might gain access to extremely important Turkish intelligence on Iran, 
Iraq and Syria.239 The Israeli air force has passage rights to Turkey’s airspace, 
benefited from training over that geography, and has been granted shelter in 
case of an emergency, which let them to be more assertive and take greater 
risks.240 And Israel found a valuable market, Turkey, for its military equipment, 
since it depends on foreign markets to sustain its military industry.241   
Undoubtedly, the two countries differ in some issues, such as a belief on 
Turkey’s side that improved relations with Israel would damage Turkish-Arab 
relations, Turkey’s desire to see the peace process succeed, including a 
satisfactory solution for the Palestinians, Turkish concerns about Israel’s attitude 
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in the Kurdish issue, and Turkey’s internal politics and public opinion to some 
extent. But positive results of this strategic partnership have been more 
outstanding.242  
For Turkey, in the Middle Eastern context, reason for the alignment with 
Israel was to put pressure on regional states that were accused of supporting 
Islamist groups and the PKK. In the global context, on the other hand, 
“…Turkey’s alignment with Israel has fundamentally a Western rather than a 
Middle Eastern target”.243       
 
3.5. Conclusion 
After continuously pursuing cautious and modest policies toward the 
Middle East during the Cold War era, with the exception of a brief period in the 
mid-1950s, Turkey has taken some actions in accordance with its new, 
assertive, and active foreign policy posture to meet the challenges of the Post 
Cold War environment. Changes in this new period, such as the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union, the Gulf War, and the Arab-Israeli peace process, as well as 
Turkey’s increased concerns about NATO’s security guarantees against threats 
emanating from the Middle East, Ankara’s search for a reliable ally in the region 
in a new environment, and noticeable sense of self confidence prevailed among 
the Turkish elites influenced Turkey’s course significantly. 
Developing close relations with Israel was among the most prominent 
foreign policy orientations of Turkey. Both countries have benefited from their 
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bilateral ties. As mentioned before, Turkey acquired a strengthened deterrence 
capability in protecting its vital interests, had the support of the powerful Jewish 
lobby in Washington as well as increased U.S. support, found an alternative 
source of high-tech military equipment, without facing human rights-related 
difficulties, compensated at least partly the losses the Turkish economy faced in 
its trade with the Middle East and North Africa after the Gulf war, and continued 
its pro-Western orientation. 
Both countries also had some differences but, in sum, positive outcomes 
of this strategic partnership have been more prominent. In the longer term, the 
strong Turkish-Israeli ties would enhance the region's stability by serving as a 
powerful military deterrent against would-be enemies. Aggressive states have 
been obliged to watch their step in the face of a formidable combination of the 
Middle East's largest and most advanced military forces, and this would weaken 
the likelihood of war.244 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE TRIANGLE: U.S. SUPPORT TO THE TURKISH-ISRAELI 
RAPPROCHEMENT  
 
4.1. Background  
During much of the Cold War period, Turkey maintained a cautious but 
consistent foreign policy toward the Middle East and tried to stay out of the 
unstable affairs and politics of the region. Although there were some alterations 
in behavior, such as the Baghdad Pact of 1955, one of the main pillars of 
Turkish foreign policy was nonintervention in regional affairs in this period.245 
The end of the Cold War has had important effects on global and regional 
politics and Turkey was among the countries most deeply affected by this event. 
Unlike most of its NATO allies, Turkey faced new threats to security in its 
surrounding environment, such as ethnic nationalism, irredentism, religious 
fundamentalism and international terrorism, causing regional instability and 
conflicts.246 In other words, Turkey has not come out from the Cold War with a 
sense of increased security.247 To meet the challenges of this period, Turkey 
altered some of its established foreign policy principles, assumed new initiatives, 
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and Turkish foreign policy in the 1990s was considerably more activist and self-
confident especially in the Middle East.248  
The Middle East peace process that effectively began with the Madrid 
Peace Conference of October 1991, had a profound effect on the nature of 
Middle Eastern politics, and opened up a new foreign policy opportunity for 
Turkey. The process continued with the conclusion of the Israeli-Palestinian 
agreement of September 1993, namely the Oslo Agreement, and Israeli-
Jordanian peace agreement of October 1994. Although caused by the 
requirements created by the end of the Cold War and the Gulf War, this was the 
first time that Arabs and Israelis have really attempted to solve their conflict 
through diplomacy. Moreover, since these negotiations have given fruits in the 
form of the Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Jordanian agreements, this new period 
became a turning point in the evolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. On the other 
hand, the birth of this new era did not denote the end of the regional conflicts. 
For Turkey, the most beneficial result of the Middle East Peace process, with an 
optimistic perception, would be that the emerging regional stability would lessen 
the external threats against the security of the Turkish Republic.249  
In the light of the developments in this new era, as mentioned earlier in 
this study, Turkey and Israel have improved their relations especially after 1993. 
High-level Turkish and Israeli visits resulted in several agreements on various 
subjects, where the most significant ones were Military Training and Cooperation 
Agreement, Free Trade Agreement, and an Agreement on defense industrial 
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cooperation in 1996.250 In addition to numerous interests and gains of Turkey 
and Israel from the rapprochement between the two, peace and stability in the 
Middle East has been the most prominent interest to not only Turkey and Israel 
but also the United States. Turkey’s basic aim which appeared to guide its 
foreign policy actions toward the Middle East was to tackle the post-Soviet 
regional challenges, such as various religious, ethnic, and border conflicts that 
have caused tensions and crises threatening regional stability, as well as the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). From the Turkish point of 
view, increased cooperation between Turkey, the United States and Israel was 
considered as a product of Turkey’s post-Cold War Middle East policy and one of 
the important ways to which Turkey has turned to achieve its post-Cold war 
aims in the region.251 
 
4.2. U.S. Approach to the Turkish-Israeli Rapprochement 
Close political-military coordination is exceptionally important in the 
Middle East, where security issues have a high profile. There are few if any 
areas of the world that combine such strategic importance to the United States 
with such chronic instability. In the words of an American official, “Instability in 
the Middle East carries profound dangers. It can threaten the security of close 
friends and partners… It can threaten our NATO partners in Europe. It can 
threaten our ability to protect vital oil supplies from the Gulf. It can bring new 
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outbreaks of terrorism to our shores. And it can fuel a race to acquire weapons 
of mass destruction.” 252  
Turkish-Israeli cooperation was possibly the most important development 
in the Middle East in this new era that had a direct link to U.S. security. The U.S. 
did not initiate increasing cooperation between its two allies. As General Çevik 
Bir (ret.) noted, “These were initiatives of the Turkish leadership” 253 However, 
U.S. policymakers found the rapprochement pleasing and Washington welcomed 
the February 1996 bilateral military accord as supportive for stability in the 
region and as useful to enforce security in the area while the Arab world stated 
concern.254 
The emerging Turkish-Israeli rapprochement has the capacity to serve 
the Americans’ interests in the Middle East for several reasons. The Middle East 
has had a great value in the eyes of the American policymakers because of its 
economic and strategic importance. Plus, the demise of the Soviet Union has 
increased the strategic importance of the Middle East by shifting the American 
administration's attention to the well-armed rogue states, such as Iran, Iraq, 
and Syria that represent new threats to Western security. The Turkish-Israeli 
rapprochement might act as a counterbalance against these rogue states as part 
of the American ‘dual containment policy’.255 “The United States needs regional 
allies to take upon themselves such tasks as regional crisis management and 
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peace-keeping, which would then leave the US free to focus on problems of 
larger magnitude.”256 
From Washington’s perspective, the Turkish-Israeli cooperation advanced 
U.S. security interests by serving as a model of regional normalization between 
Israel and Turkey, a Muslim-majority state; an opportunity for deeper trilateral 
cooperation, enhancing Israeli and Turkish security and increasing weapons 
interoperability for US forces at times of regional crisis; a source of pressure on 
Syria’s peace process policies; a potential way for the executive branch to 
bypass Congress in supporting Turkey; a potential nucleus for pulling together 
other pro-US states, such as Jordan, into a wider Middle Eastern regional 
security regime; and an improvement of Israel’s legitimacy in the eyes of the 
Turkic states of the former Soviet Union that will open the prospect of new 
avenues of Israeli cooperation among states friendly to the United States.257 
Persistent U.S. support for two such reliable, democratic allies has been vital to 
the protection of U.S. interests. Similarly, as American policymakers recognized, 
promoting cooperation among these allies would enhance regional stability and 
US leverage in the area.258 
In some ways, the Turkish-Israeli entente may also encourage the 
liberalization of the economies and democratization in the region, two goals the 
United States has been advocating, unless the democratization process weaken 
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friendly regimes of America’s major allies.259 Both Turkey and Israel are not 
prepared to play the role of the regional policeman, even if supported by 
Washington, and the U.S. has been similarly reluctant to adopt such a strategy 
not to aggravate anti-American feelings in the Arab world.260  
The United States had some concerns about this relationship. Initially, 
the addition of a military dimension to the Turkish-Israeli relationship created 
uneasiness in the minds of some American policymakers because of its negative 
effect on Israeli-Syrian peace talks. The U.S. also objected to certain aspects of 
Turkish-Israeli military cooperation particularly in the area of anti-missile 
technology. Moreover, Washington did not want this relationship to damage 
other key regional objectives, namely, Arab-Israeli peace and Turkish-Greek 
stability.261 
 
4.3. Origins of the Turkey-U.S.-Israel Triangle 
Regarding the Middle East, three main objectives of the United States, in 
the post-World War II period, were; containing Soviet communism, accessing to 
oil, and supporting Israel. In the post Cold War era, the U.S. administration 
appeared to believe that there was an opportunity to reshape the region, owing 
to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the defeat of Iraq in the Gulf War, and the 
acceptance of the Madrid/Oslo peace process by the PLO. This “new Middle 
East” would supercede the old Arab state system with a web of regional 
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economic integration projects involving Israel, Turkey, and some other states. In 
addition, new regional security agreements would be concluded whereas Israel 
would play a key role in protecting the vulnerable Arab Gulf states from Iraqi or 
Iranian threats. And, regimes, labeled by the U.S. as ‘rogue’ would be actively 
opposed through economic boycotts, diplomatic isolation, subversion and even 
the threat or application of military force.262 
As stated by a Turkish press report, the origins of the Turkish-U.S.-Israeli 
triangle for strategic cooperation in the post Cold War Middle East went back to 
1995 when then-Prime Minister Shimon Peres pointed out Israel’s acceptance of 
a U.S. offer to conclude a defense “pact” between the two countries.263 But here 
the title “pact” was used only in reference to a “Defense Agreement” to be 
concluded between the U.S. and Israel. As Peres stated, in reply to a question 
about a possible U.S.-Israel defense treaty, there were two different paths; one 
was on anti-terror combat, and the other on a defense pact.264 As President 
Clinton announced, the anti-terror path was about United States’ transfer of 
additional equipment and training, development of new anti-terror methods and 
technologies, and efforts to enhance communications and coordination between 
the U.S. and Israel as well as other governments who have joined with the U.S. 
in the war against terror.265 Concerning a defense pact between the two 
countries, there were certain advantages and some problems for Israel and the 
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U.S., as well as arguments for and against it. Yet, there is no known overall 
treaty of alliance between the two countries.266 
The main motivation of the “pact” was the common sense of a security 
threat originating from the rogue states, namely Iran, Iraq, and Syria, as the 
state supporters of international terrorism in the Middle East and the terrorist 
organizations that these states support. Efforts of the United States and Israel 
were supposed to pursue two separate tracks. The plan for the first track 
contained measures such as immediate arms transfer, mutual cooperation on 
intelligence gathering and international terrorism. The second track included 
plans to establish “the chain of regional alliances for defense of the Middle 
East”. So, the Turkish-Israeli military cooperation was to be situated at the 
center of the chain which also included plans of cooperation between the U.S. 
and some other regional states like Jordan, Oman and Qatar. Following the 
signing of the Military Training and Cooperation Agreement between Turkey and 
Israel in February 1996, the U.S. and Israel concluded an anti-terrorism 
agreement in April which paved the way for developing a “multidimensional 
regional security framework”.267 
It was also reported that the United States actively encouraged Turkey, 
Israel, Jordan and Egypt to form a new regional alliance in the Middle East. Iran, 
Iraq, and Syria, countries on the U.S. list of "state sponsors of terrorism," were 
perceived as the targets of this new restructuring and the alliance was decided 
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during a meeting at a downtown hotel in Jerusalem in November 1995, where 
President Bill Clinton, Turkey's Prime Minister Tansu Çiller, Israeli acting Prime 
Minister Simon Peres, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and King Hussein of 
Jordan got together after attending the funeral service of the assassinated 
Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. But Cairo’s discomfort of this development, 
since it threatened Egypt's aspiration to lead the Arab world, was also stated.268 
From another point of view, after the Gulf War, it became clear that 
American public opinion would not tolerate U.S. troops staying in the Middle 
East a day longer than strictly necessary and the declining economic capability 
of the U.S. added to this formula. As the necessity of regional order and peace 
in the Middle East came up, Israel was seen as the most outstanding actor for 
providing this order and peace in cooperation with the United States. So, Turkey 
regarded cooperation with Israel to be harmonious with its national interests.269 
 
4.4. Turkish-U.S.-Israeli Approaches to the Challenges of Iran, Iraq, 
and Syria 
While the ultimate aim of Turkey, the U.S., and Israel was to preserve 
peace and stability in the Middle East, the three countries differed in some of 
their approaches to the challenges of Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Turkey and the U.S. 
appeared to have different priorities of interest as well as different foreign policy 
methods to achieve these interests. Israel, on the other hand, was more 
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compatible for Turkey. In other words, Turkish-Israeli approaches seemed more 
similar, regarding the region in which the two are situated.270 
Concerning Iran, Turkey had an important place in U.S. strategy toward 
that country as an active participant in the policy of containment. In addition, 
Ankara had its own sources of friction with the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
including worries about Iranian support for Turkish Islamist fundamentalists and 
the PKK, and some terrorist attacks on outstanding Turkish secularists were 
thought to have an Iranian connection.271 Despite these considerations, Turkey 
favored a policy of engagement with Iran and tended to oppose sanctions on 
that country, because of the fact that Turkey is a neighbor of Iran and needs 
Iranian oil and gas.272 The United States followed a course of action in which it 
sought to isolate and punish Iran, as well as Iraq, through economic and military 
coercion within the context of the ‘Dual Containment’ policy. Turkey was against 
interference in the internal affairs of the country and favored relying first on the 
virtues of diplomacy.273 Israel was more concerned about Iran as a threat in 
strategic, political and terrorist terms. Israelis thought that Iran was against the 
Middle East peace process, sponsoring terrorism and was attempting to get 
weapons of mass destruction and nuclear weapons.274 
On Iraq, the United States pursued the same strategy, namely imposing 
sanctions on that country. Along with backing the U.S. efforts in the Gulf War, 
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Turkey, closed the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik oil pipeline and participated in the U.N. 
sanctions against Iraq. This made Turkey a key element in the economic 
isolation of Baghdad, but created a massive economic cost to Ankara. Its 
support for Operation Provide Comfort/Operation Northern Watch (OPC/ONW) 
gave Turkey a vital role in Washington’s Iraq policy. Formally, Ankara and 
Washington agreed on the main principles of Iraq policy by stating that Iraq 
should comply with the related Security Council resolutions. But Turkey’s main 
policy goals in Iraq were; ending, or at least easing, the U.N. sanctions on that 
country, reassertion of full Iraqi sovereignty in the north, prevention of the 
emergence of a de facto Kurdish state or an autonomous Kurdish entity, and 
expulsion of PKK from northern Iraq. Also, Ankara feared that the U.S. efforts to 
topple Saddam Hussein might further destabilize the region.275 Israel’s concerns 
over Iraq were related to the weapons of mass destruction. To remind, during 
the Gulf War Iraq sent its Scud missiles into Israeli territory. Israelis believe that 
Saddam would begin rebuilding his arsenals and his WMD if the sanctions were 
off. So, Israel wanted to see the sanctions remain.276 
Both Turkey’s and Israel’s relations with the United States contained 
some dilemmas. Turkey was extremely displeased with being left out of the 
negotiations when leaders of the two rival Iraqi Kurdish parties met with the 
officials of the State Department in Washington in September 1998. On the 
other hand, Israel, with its improved technology, became a rival for the U.S. to 
some extent, on some areas such as defense industry. And, according to a 
Turkish scholar, Israel did not fully agree with the U.S. regarding American 
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efforts for a comprehensive Israeli-PLO peace, and it was open to discussion 
whether the peace process serves Israel’s interests.277                  
Syria was another country on which Turkey and the United States 
seemed to have differing opinions, but this time with the roles changed. The 
perceived Syrian challenge to the regional stability above all was that differences 
of approach between Turkey and the U.S. proved most annoying to the Turkish 
policymakers as a consequence of the intimate Syrian linkage to PKK terrorism. 
It seemed that the Turkish policymakers felt strongly that the United States was 
abstaining from applying enough pressure on Syria to force that country to stop 
its support for the PKK in order to keep Damascus involved in the Peace 
Process. As a scholar stated, Turks were concerned that the end of a Syrian-
Israeli conflict might give Damascus more confidence about its demands toward 
Turkey by shifting its troops from the Golan Heights cease-fire line to the 
Turkish border.278 Furthermore, according to a Turkish scholar, there has always 
been a concern that the United States might pressure Turkey to provide Syria 
with additional amounts of water so that Syria can leave the water resources of 
the Golan Heights to Israel, and therefore the failure of the peace negotiations, 
then, provided some satisfaction to Turkish leaders.279 For Turkey, the water 
issue and the peace process were two separate issues.280 However, the United 
States seemed more supportive of Turkey versus Syria in the October 1998 crisis 
when Turkey compelled Syria to expel PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan from 
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Damascus and to stop its support for the organization officially or risk a Turkish 
invasion of its territory.281 
From the Israeli point of view, the problem regarding Syria was that 
Damascus has supported Hizbullah in its war against Israel, as well as 
supporting the PKK in the north. So this pointed to Syrian efforts to use 
terrorism to destabilize and weaken its neighbors. According to an Israeli 
scholar, one of the reasons for the end of the peace talks between the two 
countries was that structurally Syria was not ready to make peace. If Israel’s 
situation in the region normalized, Syria would be reduced to a third-rate power 
and a peace treaty would be the beginning of the end of a very profitable Syrian 
control over Lebanon.282 The same scholar also asserted that the U.S. policy 
toward Syria has been “We will be very nice to you in the hope that once you 
are convinced that we are friendly that you will move toward peace” but the 
policy was not “We will put tremendous pressure on you and change your 
interests in order to force you to stop sponsoring terrorism and to move toward 
peace with Israel”. He added that the Turkish method of coping with Syria in 
this regard was far more successful than the U.S. method of dealing with it.283 
It is not surprising that Turkey, the United States and Israel have 
differing priorities and approaches to the regional matters. Despite the 
abovementioned differences, the definite aim of the three countries was to have 
a stable and peaceful Middle East. When the Syrian-Israeli peace talks restarted 
in 1999, Ankara’s perception was quite different from the earlier period due to 
the fact that its relations with the negotiating parties had changed for the better 
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since the sudden end of 1995-1996 talks. No agreement was reached between 
Syria and Israel and the process stalled. On the other hand, Israeli-PLO 
negotiations, with the backing of the U.S., gained speed in July 2000, but again 
no agreement was reached and soon the Al-Aqsa Intifada erupted. The 
breakdown of the peace process and concerns about the future of Iraq posed 
serious challenges to regional stability. It was in Turkey’s interest to see the 
termination of hostilities for strategic as well as political and economic 
reasons.284 Israel has also had security concerns with its new perception that the 
principal threat became the use of weapons of mass destruction by a country 
not necessarily bordering Israel, where it was an attack from a bordering Arab 
country.285   
Indeed, as will be noted in the following paragraphs of this study, the 
cooperation between Turkey, the U.S. and Israel has been beneficial in deterring 
rogue states which all border Turkey. The cooperation was also useful on the 
subject of weapons of mass destruction programs of these states. And, working 
together in the intelligence area became valuable in fighting international terror, 
which the rogue states encouraged.286  
       
4.5. Triple Exercises 
As the symbol of the growing three-way strategic cooperation between 
Turkey, the United States, and Israel the three countries held trilateral joint drills 
including both naval and aerial exercises. Despite several complaints and 
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condemnations from the Arab world, the first trilateral naval search-and-rescue 
exercise finally took place on January 7, 1998, after months of delay.287 Later 
these naval exercises code-named "Reliant Mermaid”, continued to be taken on 
an annual basis. Although it had apparently a peaceful nature, the exercise was 
a watershed in Middle Eastern geopolitics, as evidenced by the involvement of 
senior officials.288 In addition, strategic cooperation between the three countries 
reached new heights when jet fighters from each nation’s air force began a 
major joint aerial training exercise, dubbed “Anatolian Eagle”, in the skies over 
southern Turkey, in June 2001.289 
 
4.5.1. “Reliant Mermaid”:290 
Reliant Mermaid I, the five-hour trilateral humanitarian search and rescue 
(SAR) exercise involving naval ships and aircraft from Turkey, the United States, 
and Israel, took place on January 7, 1998 in international waters off the coast of 
Israel in the Mediterranean Sea. It was originally scheduled to take place in mid-
November 1997, but the exercise was held after being twice postponed and six 
months later than planned.291 Two frigates (TCG Yavuz and TCG Zafer) and a 
helicopter from Turkey, a destroyer (USS John Rogers) and a helicopter from 
the United States, and two missile boats (INS La Hav and INS Nitzahon) and air 
elements from Israel conducted the exercise, along with observers from 
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Jordan.292 The objective of the exercise was to practice coordinated emergency 
SAR procedures. By familiarizing themselves with each other's capabilities and 
working together, elements of the three naval forces which regularly operated in 
the Mediterranean would be able to respond more effectively in the event of an 
actual emergency rescue operation. The scenario of the exercise simulated three 
sinking civilian sailboats. Jordan was invited to send an observer and responded 
by sending Rear Admiral Hussein Khassawneh, commander of the Jordanian 
Navy.293 
Reliant mermaid II was staged by the three countries’ warships this time 
off the Mediterranean cost of Turkey. The two-day exercise took place on 
December 15-16, 1999. Two Turkish frigates, two Israeli Navy corvettes, and a 
U.S. frigate joined the maneuver. It was designed to improve coordination 
among the navies for a rapid humanitarian response to maritime emergencies. 
The exercise scenario was based on a scripted search-and-rescue situation for 
training purposes and had no connection with any real world condition. Jordan, 
again, sent an observer, commander of its Navy. Other nations had been 
invited, such as Egypt and Greece, but they declined to send observers.294 
Reliant Mermaid III was held on January 17, 2001, off the coast of 
Haifa/Israel. Turkish, the United States, and Israeli navies combined in their 
third annual joint naval operation. This cooperative exercise consisted of search-
and-rescue drills, and involved both warships and planes. Objectives of the 
exercise for Turkey and Israel were to strengthen their military relationship with 
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each other and to advance their naval field training with the support of the 
United Sates. Due to scheduling errors, Jordan was unable to observe the 
exercises, as they had in previous years. Much of the Arab world, such as Syria, 
protested, saying the naval cooperation between the three countries was 
directed against them.295  
First held in 1998, the Reliant Mermaid exercises became one of the most 
visible symbols of the developing strategic partnership between Turkey, the 
United Sates, and Israel. 
 
4.5.2. Anatolian Eagle:296 
The air forces of Turkey and Israel have flown together over each other’s 
territory from the time when the two countries signed the Military Training and 
Cooperation Agreement in 1996. Likewise, Turkish and American forces have 
regularly practiced as NATO allies. And, U.S. and Israeli air units have in recent 
years begun to exchange tactics and techniques during exercises over the 
Negev desert designed to test their planes and pilots against those of other 
countries.297 
As a part of the burgeoning trilateral relationship, which has come to be 
one of the most formidable ties in the region, Turkish, American, and Israeli 
pilots engaged in simulated air battles over southern Turkey. Dubbed “Anatolian 
Eagle”, the aerial maneuvers, represented the first time the three militaries have 
come together for such mock-combat drills. During the two-week air exercises 
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ending June 29, 2001, the three forces focused on joint operations and 
command procedures, taking advantage of the similar aircraft flown by each 
nation to prepare for the possibility of combined missions during future regional 
crises. Furthermore, the participating aircraft staged attacks on ground-based 
air-defense missile sites and conducted mid-air refueling in an area near the 
Turkish city of Konya. The U.S. Air Force contributed F-16s normally deployed 
on patrol over northern Iraq, from Turkey’s Incirlik airbase, Israel arrived with a 
team of F-16 fighters, helicopters and refueling tanker aircraft, and Turkish Air 
Force contributed the largest number of aircraft to the maneuvers. According to 
Efraim Inbar regarding Anatolian Eagle, “the militaries of the three countries 
upgraded their military cooperation by adding an important air element to past 
trilateral naval search and rescue exercises”.298  And, Barry Rubin stated that 
this aerial exercise “…went beyond the limited, rescue oriented activities of the 
past”.299       
The exceptional tri-nation combination of combat forces represented by 
Anatolian Eagle, however, amounted to more than the sum of its parts. It 
served to not only improve the fighting capabilities of each side, but represented 
a unique symbol of regional stability and each party’s support for its partner’s 
security.  
 
4.6. Implications of Turkey-U.S.-Israel Triangle 
The closer Turkish-American-Israeli military cooperation had a positive 
effect on the peace process, which added up to a reluctant acceptance of Israel 
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as a regional player by most Arab states. The cooperation between the three 
capitals has been beneficial in deterring rogue states such as Iran, Iraq, and 
Syria, all bordering Turkey. And, working together in the intelligence area 
became valuable in fighting international terror, which the rogue states 
encouraged. The cooperation between the United States and its two most 
reliable allies in the Middle East also provided partial deterrence for Jordan if 
Syria or Iraq attempted to invade it, and let Jordan deal with domestic 
challenges from Palestinian nationalists or Islamic radicals more easily. Iran, 
Iraq, and Syria, who have all been engaged in subversion against the Hashemite 
rule, confronted a stronger Jordan backed by the Turkish-American-Israeli 
triangle. Some Gulf States, such as Qatar and Oman, did not object to a Turkish 
and Israeli presence to counter the weight of Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia.300 
Turkey and Israel refrained from getting involved in the domestic affairs 
of their neighbors, knowing that the necessary conditions for the emergence of 
democratic regimes takes some time. But the two countries themselves became 
“…a constant reminder that democracy is not a feature found exclusively in 
Western Europe and North America”, which increased the expectation that such 
an experience could be followed by their neighbors.301 
Aside from the abovementioned repercussions, given the strategic 
importance of the Middle East and the desire of the U.S. for an uninterrupted 
flow of oil, Turkish-American-Israeli cooperation with its stabilizing and 
balancing capabilities might become a tool for the United States in its post-Cold 
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War Middle Eastern foreign policy.302 Containing Islamic fundamentalism was 
also in the long list of common interests between Turkey, Israel, and the United 
States.303 
Unsurprisingly, this cooperation created uneasiness among the Arab 
countries as well as in Iran. Despite the Turkish and Israeli standard response 
that their relations were not directed against any third party, especially Syria, 
Egypt, Iraq, and Iran complained, i.e. a Syrian official described the Turkish-
U.S.-Israeli nexus as the most dangerous alliance witnessed since World War 
II.304 Iran, Iraq, and Syria increased their cooperation with one another. This 
seemed to be motivated by a concern to pose a counterbalance to the perceived 
threatening posture of the combined powers of the triangle.305 However, as 
Barry Rubin asserted “…Arab complaints were not reasons to limit the [Turkish-
Israeli] coalition, but proofs of its effectiveness”.306 
But, it should be noted that there was no credible evidence to suggest 
uniform perception of Turkey as constituting a threat to the Arab world. At the 
Arab Summit meeting held in Cairo on June 21-23 , 1996, the Syrian proposal 
that the Turkish-Israeli military cooperation agreement be condemned and that 
Turkey be severely criticized for its firm attitude on the water issue and its 
resorting to military threat against Syria was not uniformly accepted by the 
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other Arab states. The Final Communiqué called upon Turkey to reconsider the 
agreement but no condemnation or criticism was included in it. And none of the 
regional states inclined to cut off diplomatic relations with Ankara.307 
Regarding American involvement, the Turkish-Israeli partnership 
presented many advantages to the United States. It could provide the center of 
an American-oriented regional partnership consisting of democratic allies, as 
opposed to the authoritarian rulers upon which Washington relied on for five 
decades. U.S. involvement was a positive contribution for the Turkish-Israeli 
partnership which became a historical opportunity for the U.S. to maintain a 
strong block in the region of pro-American and pro-Western allies.308 According 
to Barry Rubin, both Turkey and Israel wanted the United States to remain 
active and strong in the Middle East, supporting their concerns.309 
In contrast, Don Waxman argued that an increasing American assistance 
to this relationship was not necessary and it might even debilitate Turkish-Israeli 
relations. A stronger U.S. role would also boost suspicion in the Arab world that 
the Turkish-Israeli connection was a part of an American plan to encircle 
them.310 Washington had important interests in countries such as Egypt and 
Saudi Arabia, which were highly suspicious of the Turkish-Israeli entente and did 
not want to aggravate anti-American feelings in the Arab world.311 And, 
according to Alan Makovsky, the United States should pay attention not to let 
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trilateral Turkish-U.S.-Israeli ties to surpass the bilateral Turkish-Israeli 
relationship in order to preserve the latter’s image of authenticity. He added that 
“The United States can more easily reap benefits if Turkish-Israeli relations do 
not carry a ‘made in the USA’ label”.312  
 
4.7. Conclusion 
Turkish-Israeli cooperation was probably the most important 
development in the Middle East that had a direct linkage to U.S. security. The 
cooperation had a potential to act as a counterbalance against the rogue states 
namely Iran, Iraq, and Syria. It advanced U.S. security interests by serving as a 
model of regional normalization between Israel and Turkey, a Muslim-majority 
state; an opportunity for deeper trilateral cooperation, enhancing Israeli and 
Turkish security; a source of pressure on Syria’s peace process policies; a 
potential way for the executive branch to bypass Congress in supporting Turkey; 
a potential nucleus for pulling together other pro-US states, such as Jordan, into 
a wider Middle Eastern regional security regime.313 As well, the United States 
had some concerns about this relationship, such as its negative effect on Israeli-
Syrian peace talks and some of its aspects particularly in the area of anti-missile 
technology.314 
Israeli and the U.S. efforts included plans to establish “the chain of 
regional alliances for defense of the Middle East”. And the Turkish-Israeli military 
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cooperation was to be situated at the center of the chain which also included 
plans of cooperation between the U.S. and some other regional states like 
Jordan, Oman and Qatar. While the ultimate aim of Turkey, the U.S., and Israel 
was to preserve peace and stability in the Middle East, the three countries 
differed in some of their approaches to the challenges of Iran, Iraq, and Syria. 
But Turkish-Israeli approaches seemed more similar.315 
As the symbol of the growing three-way strategic cooperation between 
Turkey, the United States, and Israel the three countries held trilateral joint drills 
including both naval and aerial exercises. The closer Turkish-American-Israeli 
military cooperation had a positive effect on the peace process, has been 
beneficial in deterring rogue states and on the subject of weapons of mass 
destruction programs of them as well as in fighting international terror, which 
these states encouraged. The cooperation also provided partial deterrence for 
Jordan, backed by the Turkish-American-Israeli triangle, if Syria or Iraq 
attempted to invade it. Common interests between the three countries 
continued containing Islamic fundamentalism, and encouraging democratization 
and liberalization of economies in the region.316  
While U.S. involvement was a positive contribution for the Turkish-Israeli 
partnership, an over-involvement would boost suspicion in the Arab world and 
aggravate anti-American feelings.317 As Don Waxman asserted, “[t]he United 
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States can sit back on the sidelines and watch its regional allies develop an 
alliance that may at last ensure some peace in that most troubled region in the 
world.” 318 
Regarding the strategic relations between Turkey, the United States, and 
Israel, one must keep in mind that the term ‘strategic partnership’ signifies a 
close relationship between states searching for mutual gains but whose interests 
may be competitive rather than shared.319 To sum up, even the three states had 
some conflicting views, cooperation between Turkey, the United States, and 
Israel, and some other countries, has been a very important force for 
maintaining peace and stability in the Middle East for a while.320 Strategic 
relations mean sharing plans, but this did not turn out to be the case for the 
triangular relationship in the long-run. 
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CONCLUSION  
During the Atatürk era, Turkey’s international course was neutrality and 
non-alignment which appeared to fit its objectives in the conjuncture. Following 
the Second Word War and the development of a bipolar international system, 
where neutrality could no longer guarantee the security and integrity of the 
Turkish state, the policymakers realized the potential serious threat coming from 
the Soviets, and shifted their foreign policy pattern toward an alliance with the 
West. Later, in the mid-1960s, Turkish foreign policy experienced another 
change and Turkish policymakers started to reorient their foreign policy away 
from excessive dependence on the United States. 
In the 1990s Turkey pursued an activist foreign policy course, which was 
encouraged by a variety of factors. The upsurge of political instability, war and 
ethnic conflict in the vicinity of Turkey, in the Middle East, the Caucasus and the 
Balkans stimulated Ankara to become involved in these regions. Also, Turkish 
policymakers’ efforts to show their country's geo-strategic importance to the 
West in the new era were effective in this course. Furthermore, some internal 
and external factors facilitated Turkey's efforts to expand its regional 
involvement. The economic progress of Turkey together with the modernization 
of its military, while its neighboring states experienced severe weaknesses in 
military power have been important factors in Turkey's ability to follow pro-
active and assertive policies on issues of vital national interest. The changing 
dynamics of the country’s foreign policy making, namely the increased influence 
of the President and public opinion, were also effectual. At the same time, post-
Cold War developments such as the emergence of the Turkic republics in Central 
Asia, the Gulf War, and Caspian energy developments have created new 
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opportunities for Turkey to play a larger role in several areas, while also giving 
Turkish policymakers self-confidence.      
The main objectives of Turkey have been to preserve its geo-strategic 
importance on the international scene, maintain stability in its neighboring 
regions, prevent ethnic conflicts from spreading to its territory, and gain new 
markets for its economic growth. But Turkish policymakers, while trying to reach 
their goals, carried out balanced policies between activism and caution. 
Although Turkish foreign policy in the 1990s was considerably more 
activist and self-confident in the surrounding regions; this did not mean to give 
up the traditional Turkish approach to international and regional affairs that can 
be described as moderate and cautious. Especially the Middle East has become 
the region that Turkey's active and assertive foreign policy practices are most 
profoundly seen. As Criss and Bilgin stated, Turkish foreign policy towards the 
Middle East has always been regarded as an extension of its pro-Western 
foreign policy. But, when compared to the major turning points of Turkish 
foreign policy, namely Turkey’s participation in NATO in 1952 and its new course 
of developing multilateral relations after the mid-1960s, Turkey’s assertive and 
active policy in the new era has to be regarded as the continuation of its 
traditional orientation, rather than a change. Whether it will stay on this course 
remains to be seen.321 
Turkey and the U.S. raised their relations to the level of alliance with 
Turkey’s membership to NATO and maintained their political and military 
relations in the NATO framework. In the post-Cold War era, the U.S. largely 
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realized the great importance of Turkey and its diverse strategic roles. Turkey is 
a unique country in various respects. It sits at the crossroads of the world and 
its importance comes from its geo-strategic location, its history, its size and 
strength. Turkey is the sole example of secularism, democracy and 
modernization with its predominantly Muslim population and it is a pro-Western 
state in an area of instability. From the U.S. point of view, Turkey has been a 
model, to some extent, for the Turkic Republics of the former Soviet Union, a 
bridge and line of communication between the region and the West, a barrier 
against possible Russian aggression toward the south, a rival against Russia for 
having influence over the Caucasus and Central Asia, an ideological 
counterweight against fundamentalist Iran, an alternative to Russia and Iran as 
a possible gateway for Caspian energy resources. Moreover, Turkey has 
participated in peacekeeping efforts, as the only Muslim majority NATO ally, in 
the Balkans, and has been a peaceful and influential supporter of besieged 
Muslims in its area, namely Azerbaijan, Chechnya, Bosnia and Kosovo. In 
addition, Turkey has been a supporter of Arab-Israeli peace process, an 
important contributor to a possible normalization of Israeli-Muslim world 
relations, a key element of Washington’s Iraq strategy, and a base for Operation 
Northern Watch. Shortly, Turkey has been a direct contributor to American 
power projection in adjacent regions. 
But the two countries had different approaches to some matters and had 
conflicting interests on some issues. The Middle East became the region on 
which the most conflicting views came out. The Iraqi question and the status of 
northern Iraq generated the most serious source of tension between Turkey and 
the U.S. Both countries differ in their objectives and priorities, sometimes in 
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important respects. Turkey’s main policy goals in Iraq were; ending, or at least 
easing, the U.N. sanctions on that country because of its economic concerns, 
reassertion of full Iraqi sovereignty in the north, prevention of the emergence of 
a de facto Kurdish state or an autonomous Kurdish entity, and expulsion of PKK 
from northern Iraq. Washington, on the other hand, did not oppose Kurdish 
autonomy or a Kurdish component within a federated Iraq since, according to 
them, Saddam Hussein was the primary threat to stability and peace in the 
region. About Iran, Turkey did not want to bear the economic burden of what it 
considered as mostly a U.S. foreign policy problem. Ankara favored a policy of 
engagement with Iran while Washington generally sought to isolate that 
country. Turkish policymakers want the U.S. to apply more pressure on Syria, 
particularly regarding its support for the PKK while U.S. policymakers were more 
concerned about getting Syria's support for the peace process. U.S. critics about 
Turkey’s human rights records, although not so severe, and anti-Turkish lobbies 
in the Congress, affecting U.S. arms exports to Turkey, also created serious 
concerns in the minds of the Turkish leaders.     
Despite many conflicting interests of Turkey and the United States, the 
two countries were mostly harmonious on various subjects. It was obvious that 
the United States was a better friend for Turkey than other Western powers. 
Washington showed more willingness than European countries to accept the 
PKK as a terrorist organization. It supported Ankara’s energy politics, to some 
extent, concerning Central Asia. It was less insistent than the E.U. on the Cyprus 
issue, not to disappoint Ankara. It also tried to convince the E.U. to give Turkey 
a candidate status. But, although the two countries were mostly congruent, 
there was always a possibility that Turkish-American relations would be 
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negatively influenced by some conflicting views. In the words of George Harris; 
“…it is not sufficient to assume that close ties in the past will assure smooth 
relations in the future.” 322 
The evolution of American defense policy in general and security strategy 
towards the Middle East, Caucasus and Balkans in particular; Turkey’s 
autonomous regional policies which could seriously clash with American 
interests; and Turkey’s economic and political stability would be expected to 
affect the relations between the two countries. The United States, indeed, does 
not want a stronger Turkey capable of enforcing its own interests as a regional 
power. Reasons for this are domestic political considerations, mostly relating to 
Greek and Armenian origin Americans; doubts about Turkey's regional image, 
regarding its imperial past; and a certain suspicion concerning whether a strong 
Turkey, which is able to act as an independent regional force, would behave in 
ways that enhance U.S. interests. “Some U.S. policymakers wonder if a stronger 
and therefore more independent Turkey would be more or less confrontational 
with Greece, more or less forthcoming on Cyprus policy, and more or less 
inclined to support U.S. policy toward the Kurds of northern Iraq.”323 
No matter what U.S. attitudes on these questions are, a stronger, more 
activist and more confident Turkey emerged in the post-Cold war era. And to 
remind, as it was proved in the past, it is difficult to pressure Turkey on issues 
of major national interests. 
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After continuously pursuing cautious and modest policies toward the 
Middle East during the Cold War era, with the exception of a brief period in the 
mid-1950s, Turkey has taken some actions in accordance with its new, 
assertive, and active foreign policy posture to meet the challenges of the Post 
Cold War environment. Changes in this new period, such as the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union, the Gulf War, and the Arab-Israeli peace process, as well as 
Turkey’s increased concerns about NATO’s security guarantees against threats 
emanating from the Middle East, Ankara’s search for a reliable ally in the region 
in a new environment, and noticeable sense of self confidence prevailed among 
the Turkish elites influenced Turkey’s course significantly. 
Turkey and Israel are unique in the Middle East as the only countries with 
democratic regimes and democratic culture with multi-party systems. Both share 
western moral values. Developing close relations with Israel was among the 
most prominent foreign policy orientations of Turkey. Both countries have 
benefited from their bilateral ties. Turkey acquired a strengthened deterrence 
capability in protecting its vital interests, had the support of the powerful Jewish 
lobby in Washington as well as increased U.S. support, found an alternative 
source of high-tech military equipment, without facing human rights-related 
difficulties, compensated at least partly the losses the Turkish economy faced in 
its trade with the Middle East after the Gulf war, and continued its pro-Western 
orientation. 
Both countries also had some differences but, in sum, positive outcomes 
of this strategic partnership have been more prominent. In the longer term, the 
strong Turkish-Israeli ties would enhance the region's stability by serving as a 
powerful military deterrent against would-be enemies. Aggressive states have 
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been obliged to watch their step in the face of a formidable combination of the 
Middle East's largest and most advanced military forces, and this should weaken 
the likelihood of war.324 But, aside from the security-related issues, civilian 
domains of the relations between these two democratic countries of the Middle 
East are worthy to study. To remind, the continuity of this strategic partnership 
depends on civilian fields as well as the security or military domains.   
Turkish-Israeli cooperation was probably the most important 
development in the Middle East that had a direct linkage to U.S. security. The 
cooperation had a potential to act as a counterbalance against the rogue states 
namely Iran, Iraq, and Syria. It advanced U.S. security interests by serving as a 
model of regional normalization between Israel and Turkey, a Muslim-majority 
state; an opportunity for deeper trilateral cooperation, enhancing Israeli and 
Turkish security; a source of pressure on Syria’s peace process policies; a 
potential way for the executive branch to bypass Congress in supporting Turkey; 
a potential nucleus for pulling together other pro-US states, such as Jordan, into 
a wider Middle Eastern regional security regime.325 As well, the U.S. had some 
concerns about this relationship, such as its negative effect on Israeli-Syrian 
peace talks and some of its aspects particularly in the area of anti-missile 
technology.326 
Israeli and the U.S. efforts included plans to establish “the chain of 
regional alliances for defense of the Middle East”. And the Turkish-Israeli military 
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cooperation was to be situated at the center of the chain which also included 
plans of cooperation between the U.S. and some other regional states like 
Jordan. While the ultimate aim of Turkey, the U.S., and Israel was to preserve 
peace and stability in the Middle East, the three countries differed in some of 
their approaches to the challenges of Iran, Iraq, and Syria. But Turkish-Israeli 
approaches seemed more similar.327 
As the symbol of the growing three-way strategic cooperation between 
Turkey, the United States, and Israel the three countries held trilateral joint drills 
including both naval and aerial exercises. The closer Turkish-American-Israeli 
military cooperation had a positive effect on the peace process, has been 
beneficial in deterring rogue states and on the subject of weapons of mass 
destruction programs as well as in fighting international terrorism, which these 
states encouraged. The cooperation also provided partial deterrence for Jordan, 
backed by the Turkish-American-Israeli triangle, if Syria or Iraq attempted to 
invade it. Common interests between the three countries continued to be 
containing Islamic fundamentalism, and encouraging democratization and 
liberalization of economies in the region.328  
While U.S. involvement was a positive contribution for the Turkish-Israeli 
partnership, an over-involvement would boost suspicion in the Arab world and 
aggravate anti-American feelings.329 As Don Waxman asserted, “[t]he United 
                                                 
327 Mahmut Bali Aykan, “The Turkey-U.S.-Israel Triangle: Continuity, Change and Implications for 
Turkey’s Post-Cold War Middle East Policy”, Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, 
22:4, (Summer 1999), pp.6-8. 
328 Efraim Inbar, “The Israeli-Turkish Entente”, Jerusalem Post, July 9, 2001, and David Ivry, 
“Concluding Remarks on the U.S.-Turkish-Israeli Cooperation”, Speech delivered at a meeting 
“Turkey-Israel-US Trialogue”, held at BESA Center for Strategic Studies, Ramat Gan, December 
10, 2002. 
329 See Efraim Inbar, “Regional Implications of the Israeli-Turkish Strategic Partnership”, in Efraim 
Inbar, The Israeli-Turkish Strategic Partnership, (Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan University Publications, 
2003), pp.30-33. 
 139 
States can sit back on the sidelines and watch its regional allies develop an 
alliance that may at last ensure some peace in that most troubled region in the 
world.” 330 
Regarding the strategic relations between Turkey, the United States, and 
Israel, one must keep in mind that the term ‘strategic partnership’ signifies a 
close relationship between states searching for mutual gains but whose interests 
may be competitive rather than shared.331 To sum up, even the three states had 
some conflicting views, cooperation between Turkey, the United States, and 
Israel, and some other countries, has been a very important force for 
maintaining peace and stability in the Middle East for a while.332 Strategic 
relations also mean sharing plans, but this did not turn out to be the case for 
the triangular relationship in the long-run, competition has penetrated the 
relations. 
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